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1INTRODUCTION
In his 1982 book, Witgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke
proposed what turned out to be an extremely controversial interpretation of Ludwig
Wittgenstein s Philosophical Investigations. Kripke claimed that one of the central
themes of Philosophical Investigations (or at least of the sections prior to §243 of
Philosophical Investigations) is Wittgenstein’s discussion of what Kripke calls the
sceptical paradox about meaning and the subsequent ‘sceptical solution’. According to
Kripke, Wittgenstein exposes us to the possibility that any candidate for the ‘meaning-
constitutive fact’ can be interpreted in a variety of ways, i.e. that no particular state can
account for the normative relationship between predicates and their applications. This
would seem to lead us to the conclusion that “there can be no such thing as meaning
anything by any word.” 1 Of course, this is not a conclusion which we can live with, if only
because language is in fact possible. So, Kripke asserts, that Wittgenstein while agreeing
with sceptic that there is no such meaning-constitutive facts “in either the ‘internal’ or the
‘external’ world” 2 claims that our notion of meaning is preserved by the assertability
conditions which necessarily include reference to community agreement.
Despite its apparent coherence and elegance, this interpretation of Wittgenstein has
been severely criticised by numerous authors. And although these criticisms of Kripke’s
interpretation are extremely diverse and aimed at every aspect of his ‘sceptical paradox’
1 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1982), p. 55.
:
Kripke, p. 69.
2and the ‘sceptical solution’ one theme seems to run through many of them. The objection
is that there is no reason to believe that in these sections Wittgenstein was proposing any
kind of sceptical paradox’ and, even less would accept its conclusions. Also, there is no
reason to believe that he would endorse anything like the ‘sceptical solution’ proposed by
Kripke. Even the advocates of what may be called the ‘communitarian view’ of meaning
(i.e. roughly the view presented by Kripke in the ‘sceptical solution’) agree that while
Kiipke s conclusions about meaning are broadly correct (from the communitarian
standpoint), they do not reflect Wittgenstein’s thinking on the matter. 3 Thus, the
sentiment goes, despite its apparent merits, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is
entirely misguided.
This treatment of Kripke’s interpretation seems to me to be too short. Though
Kripke makes virtually no attempt to tie his interpretation with Wittgenstein’s own
arguments in the pre §243 sections of Philosophical Investigations, a careful examination
of Kripke’s account will reveal that it is much closer to Wittgenstein’s own discussion in
the pre §243 sections of Philosophical Investigations than is generally granted. Indeed, if
Kripke’s argument would be adequately summarised by the rough outline given above,
then of course there is little reason to believe that it either reflects Wittgenstein’s view on
the matter, or can satisfactorily explain how is meaningful language possible. However,
Kripke’s discussion in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is itself a complex
piece of philosophical work not easily summarised in a short paragraph.
' See for example, Crispin Wright’s “Kripke’s Account of the Argument Against Private Language”,
( Journal of Philosophy , 81, 1984).
3As I shall argue, the discussion of the various candidates for meaning-constitutive
tacts to account for the normative relationships between predicates and their applications
in Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’ closely mirrors Wittgenstein’s own discussion in
Philosophical Investigations. I shall further claim, that Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ fails
to account tor normativity precisely because Kripke does not appreciate the full-extent of
what may be called the ‘sceptical conclusions’ of Wittgenstein’s discussion! That is, in
proposing the ‘sceptical solution’ Kripke fails to appreciate the fact that applications of
the predicates are not justified by an appeal to any intermediate entity, whether mental
state, Platonic idea, or ‘community agreement’. Predicates have a normative relationship
to their applications in virtue of the internal relationships forged in the grammar of our
language. This I believe is the gist of Wittgenstein s discussion in the sections preceding
the discussion of the private language argument in Philosophical Investigations.
Furthermore, even though Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ does not provide us with
an adequate way to explain the normative relationship between predicates and their
applications, I believe that construed in a certain way, it points to the important features of
the background conditions of our language which help clarify the overall picture
Wittgenstein has of the workings of our language. Finally, I shall claim that Kripke is
correct in asserting that this discussion of meaning in the sections preceding what is
known as the private language argument has important implications for Wittgenstein’s
argument against private language. In other word, the correct understanding of the way
terms of our language come to have meaning, would preclude, at least in part, the
possibility of having a language intelligible to only one person.
4In this attempt to bring closer Wittgenstein and Kripke, I shall try to imitate the
structure of Kripke'
s
exposition as much as possible. In the first chapter, I shall
investigate the structure and the conclusions of Kripke’s sceptical paradox, and then argue
that his sceptical solution’ does not adequately answer the concerns raised by the
paradox. In chapter two, I shall present a sketch of Wittgenstein’s own discussion which
is developed along the lines of Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’. I shall further consider what I
take to be Wittgenstem’s own answer to the question of how predicates have normative
lelationships with their extension’. In the final chapter, I attempt to make the conclusions
of Kripke s ‘sceptical solution’ more palatable by construing the solution as calling our
attention to the important tacts about what may be called the background conditions of
our linguistic practices. I shall also briefly touch on the question of private-language to
underscore Kripke’s claim that the conclusions of Wittgenstein’s discussion in pre §243
sections are an important ingredient in his subsequent rejection of private-language.
To summarise, I believe that the pre §243 sections of Philosophical Investigations
provide us with a coherent discussion and criticisms of various theories of meaning along
the lines of the discussion presented by Kripke in his ‘sceptical paradox’. The acceptance
of this interpretation of Wittgenstein, however, does not commit us, Kripke’s claims
notwithstanding, to the ‘sceptical solution’ proposed in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language. In fact, Wittgenstein proposes his own solution to the question of what it is
for a predicate to have meaning which is better suited to account for the normative
relationship between predicates and their applications. Finally, although Kripke’s
‘sceptical solution’ is not suited to answer the question of how predicates have normative
5relationships with their applications, it does bring to our attention important facts about
what may be called the background of our language.
Following my limited objectives, I do not attempt to provide a detailed criticism of
the various theories of meaning discussed or a defence of Wittgenstein’s view on meaning.
These are issues which have been at the centre of philosophical discussion in the analytic
tradition for the better part of the twentieth century. My objective is simply to discuss
how, viewed through the prism of normativity, sections preceding the discussion of private
language in Philosophical Investigations present us with an interesting and prima facia
plausible account of what it is for the predicates (expressions, symbols) of our language to
have meaning.
Finally, this paper should in no way be taken as providing a comprehensive
account of the discussion surrounding Wittgenstein’s or Kripke’s views on rule-following
and meaning. The amount of secondary literature dedicated to these issues is truly
bewildering and even a general survey of all the arguments and counter-arguments is
beyond the scope of a Masters Thesis. I attempt to present Kripke’s and Wittgenstein’s
argument as it ‘struck’ me, and not in the comprehensive framework of secondary
literature surrounding the writings of these two authors. However, given this profusion of
the secondary literature on the subject, I must be careful in claiming to have any original
or new insights. Although I have not encountered in my research the discussion of Kripke
and Wittgenstein in the same vain as mine, many of the arguments that I propose have
been discussed in the literature before, and it is possible that what I believe to be my
original points, have been put forward by some other authors.
6CHAPTER 1
Section I
Beiore we can take a closer look at Kripke’s version of the sceptical paradox one
important clarification must be made. Though Kripke begins his discussion of the
sceptical paradox’ with a mathematical example and a discussion of rule-following, his
fundamental objective in the discussion to make sense of the concept of meaning, (as, I
believe, was Wittgenstein s). 4 The mathematical example which is initially used by Kripke
piovides a convenient segue into a general discussion of what it is for predicates of all
types to have meaning. Hence, in what follows I shall present Kripke’s (and
Wittgenstein s) discussion (including discussion of rule-following) as concerned, primarily,
with the issue of what it is for a predicate to ‘mean’ something.
The paradox has its beginnings in the fact that no matter how extensive our
previous usage of some predicate is, we can never be sure that in a new application we are
using the predicate in the same way as before. In other words, any particular set of
applications/uses that we made of the predicate is compatible with an infinite number of
‘rules’ which presumably govern our use of predicates. The example Kripke gives to
illustrate this point is an addition problem, ‘68+57’, where the meaning of the *+’ sign is at
issue. The fact that we have used ‘+’ in the past to mean the rule of ‘addition’ 5
,
does not
4
Kripke writes: “Following Wittgenstein, I will develop the problem initially with respect to mathematical
examples, though the relevant sceptical problem applies to all meaningful uses of language.” (Kripke, p.
7).
There is a certain awkwardness in saying that in the past we ‘used the symbol to mean addition’. I shall
discuss this awkwardness in the next chapter.
7help us in this new (per hypothesis) addition problem. All of our previous uses of the V
are compatible with the rule which we may call ‘quaddition function’ which is defined as
follows: x©y=x+y, if x, y <57 and =5 otherwise. 6 Indeed, our previous responses are
compatible with the symbol '+' meaning infinitely many mathematical functions! So. how
can we be sure in our application of the ‘+’ sign. Should we answer ‘125’ or ‘5’? The
obvious answer to this apparent difficulty is that what determines our application of the
predicate is not inference from previous usage, but the meaning of the predicate in
question. Meanings, not inferences from previous usage tell us what is the correct use of
some term. And, so, Kripke in the guise of sceptic investigates various candidates for the
meaning-constitutive facts.
The structure of Kripke’s sceptical paradox is fairly straightforward. After
introducing to us the ‘crazy’ sceptic who does not believe that it is possible for any
predicate to have a meaning, Kripke, in an apparent attempt to counteract the sceptic’s
‘radical’ implications, surveys various ways in which the notion of meaning might be
cashed out. Unfortunately, after assessing the various candidates (e.g. ‘final’
reinterpretations, occurrent mental states, dispositions, etc.), Kripke concludes that none
of them could qualify as ‘meaning’. Hence, Kripke concludes, unless we find some
alternative solution, we would be left with the intolerable conclusion that language is
impossible.
Kripke, 9.
8In posing his paradox the sceptic assumes that any candidate for a meaning-
constitutive fact must satisfy one ‘basic condition’ which may be called the normativity of
meaning. 1 That is, any state/property/concept which constitutes the meaning of a
piedicate must be such that it would determine the correct application of that predicate.
Meaning of the V, for example would tell us that ‘125’ is the response we are supposed
to give to the ‘68+57’. The meaning of the term ‘red’ would somehow tell us that we
should apply this term to ripe strawberries and tomatoes and not to eggplants or
cucumbers. The meaning of a predicate would, as it were, divide up reality into
objects/applications which are correct for a particular predicate, and those that are not.
However, as we shall see, all of the candidates considered by Kripke fail this all-important,
and natural requirement.
Kripke considers two ways in which a meaning-constitutive fact might be thought
to assure normativity, by determining which answers/objects/applications accord with the
it. First, as in the case of the ‘final’ interpretation, the idea would be that such final
interpretation would, as it were, come complete with the ‘method of projection.’ 8 In other
words, the interpretation would be such that it would show with complete determinacy
which applications/uses are the ‘right’ ones for particular predicate. Unfortunately, as we
shall, see no interpretation could satisfy this condition for the simple reason that there
could not be any such ‘final’ interpretation which is not subject to further interpretations.
The second, an apparently more plausible way in which meanings might account for
Kripke, p. 1 Iff.
* Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
.
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), §149.
9normativity and avoid the problem of ‘infinite regress of interpretations’ is by actually
containing all possible applications of the predicate. If such states could actually contain
aU possible instances of the use of a predicate, there would be no need to interpret
anything, every use would be ‘assured’ by the very nature of the state. And it seems that
dispositional facts, and a certain kind of occurrent mental states are such that they could
account for normativity of meanmg in this way, by actually containing (in some sense) all
applications of the predicate. But, as we shall see, it is not the case that such finite states
could either contain all the possible applications of a predicate or, even if they could,
assure that the responses we would give are those that would accord with the actual
extension/use of the predicate.
In fact, Kripke considers three candidates for the meaning-constitutive fact: (i)
some ‘final’ (basic) interpretation of an expression, (ii) dispositional states, and (iii)
primitive occurrent mental states . 9 In distinguishing these three candidates, I do not mean
to imply that they necessarily belong to different ontological categories. For example,
various interpretations (pictures, reformulations of rules) of predicates are certainly types
of mental states. Even dispositions are called by Wittgenstein ‘states of mental
apparatus ’. 10 Rather, these candidates differ in the way they attempt to account for the
normativity requirement above.
9 Although Kripke does not explicitly structure his discussion around the three candidates identified
above, it seems to me that the gist of his arguments would be well captured by discussing these candidates.
10
Wittgenstein [ 1 98 1 ], §149.
(i) ‘Final’ (Basic) Interpretation
10
According to the first view, the meaning-constitutive fact consists in our having some
tinal interpretation of a predicate. Clearly, we do not, in the case of mathematical
problems, for example, infer which function we mean from the previous responses we
made; instead we foUow rules which determine which function we mean and which
lesponse is the correct one. Similarly, in the case of words such as ‘table’ and ‘chair’ we
do not simply extrapolate from our previous application, we have [internalized] rules
which tell us what the correct application of these terms is. So, according to this first
theory of meaning there is some singular formulation/interpretation/picture “engraved on
my mind as on a slate,” 11 (embodied in some way in a concept, written down in
mentalise
,
represented as a picture) which provides for the meaning of a particular
predicate. Unfortunately, as the sceptic concludes after discussing this view of meaning
there cannot be any such basic (final) interpretations which would provide meaning for
terms in our language.
The problem here is akin to the difficulty of deriving meaning by inference from the
actual use. Suppose an interpretation were to take a form of a linguistic rule. Such rule
would itself contain various predicates which must in turn be interpreted in some way. As
we saw, our past use of any symbol is compatible with an infinite number of
interpretations, and hence, the formulation of some ‘basic’ linguistic interpretation itself
could be interpreted in infinitely many ways. Of course, giving further rules for
11
Kripke, p. 15.
11
interpreting terms of such an interpretation would take away its 'basic’ status, and would
give us another formulation which would in turn need to be interpreted, and so on and so
forth. We would be lead to an infinite regress. So, it seems that no 'basic’ linguistic
interpretation can be found which could determine the correct application of a predicate.
Any such interpretation would be susceptible to the sceptical doubt, and hence could not
qualify for the status of the meaning-constitutive fact.
A more plausible candidate for the status of ‘final’ interpretation, is some sort of
picture or image. The idea here is that upon hearing (or uttering) a word a certain picture
comes to our mind. When we hear the word ‘cube’ we “see”, as it were, the image of a
cube, when we hear ‘table’ we “see” the image of a table, etc. And all we need to do then,
is to apply the picture to objects out there in the world to determine which objects are in
the extension of the predicate in question. Despite the initial plausibility of this view of
meaning (and the long philosophical tradition behind it), the difficulties with it are only too
obvious. Any picture can be interpreted in a variety of ways, indeed in an infinite number
of ways! To take Wittgenstein’s own example, the picture of a cube can plausibly be
interpreted as representing a triangular prism, for example. So upon hearing the word
‘cube’ and having the appropriate image in mind, we may apply it to triangular prisms
instead of cubes. And, it would not help to say that such images come with ‘method of
projection’ which would assure its appropriate application. This, as Kripke points out, is
tantamount to creating ‘a rule for interpreting a rule’, and such further rules, as we saw
earlier in discussion of linguistic interpretations, can themselves be interpreted and in a
variety of ways. So, this latest proposal for the meaning-constitutive fact fails just as the
12
previous one. In fact, even if such images assured normativity, they would not be
sufficient to account for the variety of predicates employed in a natural language. What
kind ot image must we have when we intend plus function by the V? What kind of image
would accompany the term ‘different’ for example? In order for this proposal to work at
all, both the linguistic and picture interpretations must be employed. As we saw, however,
neither kind of interpretation can account for the normativity of meaning. The
fundamental difficulty here, is not simply that it is possible for us to doubt whether we
apply such interpretations correctly. Rather the problem here is that nothing about these
interpretations can account for the special, normative connection meanings presumably
have to their extensions. Such special connection would not simply correlate the meaning
and some set of objects that may be interpreted as possible applications of a particular
meaning. Instead, the meaning must be somehow ‘inextricably’ connected with its
application
.
12
In face of these difficulties, Kripke considers the second type of candidate which
seems to be able to account for normativity of meaning in a different way. What makes
dispositions and certain kinds of occurrent mental states different from the interpretations
discussed above is their apparent ability to incorporate (in some sense) all the applications
of the predicates. Indeed it seems that if we had some state which actually contained all of
predicate’s applications, then there would not be any need for any interpretation to
12
This, of course, is only a metaphor that we have of the relationship between meanings and objects in the
world. Ultimately, as will be shown in this paper, this is a misguided idea in virtue of the fact that there
are no, and could not be any such ‘meanings'. However, in investigating various candidates for the
meaning-constitutive facts Kripke (rightly) assumes the existence of such relationship.
13
determine which applications are in accord with a predicate’s meaning. And so Kripke
considers two candidates which seem to fit the bill: dispositions and a special kind of
occurrent mental states.
(ii) Dispositions
According to dispositional accounts of meaning, to mean the plus function by the symbol
or table by 'table’ is to have a certain disposition to apply these symbols. So, in our
original case our meaning the plus function is ‘embodied’ in our disposition to respond
with ‘ 125’ to the given mathematical problem. Now, after a protracted discussion of this
candidate, Kripke points out that ultimately ‘all the difficulties’ associated with this
account come down to the inability to account for the normativity of meaning. In terms of
disposition, the normativity requirement might be cashed out in the following way:
Dispositional facts about the use of some term would have to give us the definitive answer
to the question of what is the extension/correct application of a term. Unfortunately, as
Kripke persuasively argues it is doubtful that any dispositional facts can provide us with
such an answer.
Presumably, the dispositional account of meaning would attempt to accommodate
the requirement of specifying the extension of the term by simply appealing to the fact that
we have dispositions for every application of a given predicate. The set of all dispositions
for my use of the term ‘table’ contains as it were all the applications of this term.
However, one may object, that our dispositions to apply any particular term are finite just
as our mind is. In what sense can we say that we have dispositions about the use of the
14
+' for numbers that are too large for us to grasp ? 13 Is there any reason for us to believe
that we would have determinate dispositions for the use of '+’ with regard to these
‘unthinkable’ numbers?!
But suppose we do in fact have ‘infinite’ dispositions for the use of every
piedicate. This fact by itself would not assure that the objects/uses picked out by such
dispositions constitute the extension of any particular predicate.
First, as Kripke puts it, most of us have dispositions to make mistakes .” 14
Consider tor example the word ‘table’. We have certain dispositions to apply this term.
We apply it to four legged tables, three legged tables, small tables, coffee tables, etc. We
also sometimes apply it to things that are not tables, (e.g. table-like chairs), in fact we have
a disposition to apply this term to tables and, under certain circumstances, to objects that
are not tables. Now, if the dispositions would be ‘meaning-constitutive’ items, we would
have to grant that the extension of the term ‘table’ includes both tables and non-tables!
It may be objected here that this view of how dispositions provide for meaning is
too simplistic. After all, when determining the meaning of the word ‘table’, we ought to
exclude the dispositions to make mistakes and apply the term to something that is not in
its extension. So, it is not the case that all dispositions we have regarding the application
of some predicate are ‘meaning-constitutive’. Only the ‘non-mistaken’ dispositions can be
permitted for this role. It must be clear, however, that this “clarification” of how
dispositions can be meaning-constitutive is ineffective against our original objection. In
13
Kripke, p. 26-28.
14
Kripke, p. 28-29.
15
order to be able to exclude ‘mistaken’ dispositions, we would have to know that the
objects picked out by those dispositions are not the right ones, that is, we would have to
have some independent criteria (perhaps the meanmg!) to decides which dispositions give
the extension of the word ‘table’ and which do not. And hence, it is not the case that we
could ‘read off the extension of our terms from the totality of our dispositions for the use
of some predicate.
Furthermore, even if the responses we are disposed to give happen to correspond
exactly to the proper extension of some term, there is nothing logically in the concept of
disposition that would tell us that this extension is the extension of the predicate in
question. Suppose that we, in fact, were disposed to apply the term ‘table’ only to tables,
there is nothing in this fact that would tell us that tables are such things that the term
‘table’ should be applied uniquely to them! On the other hand, the meaning of the term
‘table’ would tell us (in some way) that the term ‘table’ should be applied only to tables.
In some sense, these difficulties mirror the difficulties of the ‘final interpretation’
or ‘picture’ account of meaning. Even if we interpret some rule for the application of a
predicate in such a way that it accords with the predicate’s extension, there would be
nothing about such rule/interpretation that would tell us that an interpretation is the ‘right’
one, or that the objects picked in accordance with it are the objects in the predicate’s
extension. After all, as Kripke points out “the relation of meaning and intention to future
action is normative, not descriptive .” 15 And neither dispositions nor any ‘basic’
Kripke, p. 37.
15
16
interpretations have this normative relationship to extension/use of predicates. We must
conclude then, that dispositions do not qualify for the status of meaning-constitutive fact.
(iii) Occurrent Mental States
Tire final candidate considered by Kripke is a “state even more sui generis than we have
argued before. Suppose, we can establish that whenever we use the ‘+’ a certain
primitive mental state accompanies such a use. This state, as any other candidate, has to
satisfy the above basic condition, it has to determine the correct application of the
piedicate in question. So, the picture here is of a tripartite relationship. First, we have an
expression/formulation of a rule. It further connects to a some mental state (of mysterious
nature), which in turn uniquely determines actions/objects that are in accordance with our
original term/rule-formulation. These mental states would function as connectors between
our linguistic expressions and objects ‘out there’ in the world. In the case of our original
problem, such mental state would somehow connect the V symbol used in the expression
'68+57’ with the arithmetic function of ‘addition’ (which in turn would give us the correct
answer ‘125’). 17
The problem with this account is two-fold. Since this would be a finite state in our
finite minds, such a state could not ‘contain’ (determine non-causally) all the answers to an
addition function. Furthermore, it would not help to think of addition functions Platonic
16 Kripke, p. 51
17 This Platonistic picture seems to me to be in fact the picture that Kripke has in mind. I shall return to
this question in the next chapter.
17
entities, i.e. as an objective, abstract entity "containing with it all its instances, such as the
triple (68, 57, 125). The problem is that it is not clear how a finite idea in our minds can
grasp any particular Platonic function. 18 What properties must such an idea have for it to
be determinately connected to one function and not the other?! Perhaps, it would be some
further idea that would assure a unique connection? But this simply would set us on the
road to the same infinite regress, as in the case of linguistic interpretations of the rule.
Even if we waive the ‘infinity’ problem, the considerations adduced against the
dispositional account of meaning would hold against this account as well. After all, even
if such a state would determine all of the applications of a particular predicate, it would
fail to show that these applications are the correct ones. At most it might tell me that I am
somehow causally determined to give certain responses in particular instances of the use
of a predicate, not that these responses accord with the extension/correct use of the
predicate.
We must conclude, as does Kripke’s sceptic, that an appeal to mental states is “an
unhelpful evasion of the problem...” 19 Even if we postulate such a state it cannot,
logically, possess the qualities that we require of meaning, and hence such a state would
be no more than an ‘idle wheel’ in our already confused ontology.
By way of summary we must emphasise that although the ‘sceptical paradox’ had
its source in a somewhat unlikely case of doubt about our ordinary use of *+’ it has led us
IS
Kripke, p. 54.
|lJ
Kripke, p. 54. Kripke uses this expression in a context different from mine.
18
to the considerations of the central question in philosophy of language: how do words
have meaning. The fundamental difficulty with all the candidates for 'meaning-constitutive
facts’, considered above, is their inability to account for the special relationship between
meanings of predicates and their extension/application. As Kripke (and other
commentators) acknowledge, the relationship between meaning and its extension is
internal or normative
,
and it was shown that the relationship between the candidates
investigated above and the extension/correct use of a predicate is ‘external’ or
descriptive
. I shall have more to say about the ‘internal’ relationship in my discussion of
Wittgenstein’s solution to the difficulties of the sort raised by Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’.
All I hoped to show by the discussion in the above section is that Kripke’s paradox is in
tact a legitimate and powerful exposition of the inadequacy of what may be very roughly
called the ‘meaning as a state’ account of meaning. It is unfortunate that the solution
proposed by Kripke to resolve these difficulties is, in many ways, the product of the same
misguided view of meaning.
Section II
As we saw, the main conclusion of the above paradox is that language, at least in
the way we usually conceive of it, is impossible. This is, naturally, not a conclusion that
we can live with. There ought to be a solution to this apparent paradox, if only because
language is in fact possible. And Kripke claims that he has such a solution. He also
claims, however, that a solution to this paradox cannot be a straight solution, i.e. a
solution that shows that "on closer examination the scepticism proves to be unwarranted;
2,1
Kripke, p. 25, 19n.
19
an elusive and complex argument proves the thesis the sceptic doubted ." 21 A straight
solution to the above paradox would show that sceptic overlooked, the 'facts' of the
requisite kind that constitute our meaning something. Kripke claims no such solution is
possible. The paradox can be resolved only by a sceptical solution. A sceptical solution,
in contrast to a straight solution, concedes "that the sceptic’s negative assertions are
unanswerable. Nevertheless, our ordinary practice or belief is justified because-contrary
appearances notwithstanding-it need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to
be untenable ." 22 In other words, Kripke accepts the sceptic’s contention there are no
mental facts about individuals that constitute their meaning something. Furthermore,
according to Kripke's solution, it does not make sense to ever speak of an individual,
considered by himself, as meaning anything
.
23
The main ingredient in Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ to the ‘sceptical paradox’ is a
switch from the truth conditional to the assertability conditional view of meaning.
^
“Wittgenstein replaces the question, ‘What must be the case for this sentence to
be true?’ by two others: first, ‘Under what conditions may thisform of words be
appropriately asserted (or denied)?’-, second, given an answer to the first
question, ‘What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting
(or denying) the form of words under these conditions ?”’ 25 (my italics)
21
Kripke, p. 66.
22
Kripke, p. 66.
2J Kripke, p. 68-69.
24
Kripke, p. 74.
25 Kripke, p. 73.
20
Despite the verificatiomst overtones of this picture Kripke points out that Wittgenstein’s
account is fundamentally different. The second condition has to do with the role and
utility ot such assertions in our lives. “Such a role must exist, if this aspect of the
language game is not to be idle.”26 So, what is Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution to our
paradox?
First, Kripke bids us to look at an individual ‘in isolation’. The situation here is
dire, yet paradoxically unproblematic. On the one hand, no mathematically able adult ever
hesitates when asked what is the answer to ‘68+57’. “Almost all of us unhesitatingly
produce the answer ‘125’ when asked for the sum of ‘68 and 57’, without any thought to
the theoretical possibility that quus-like rule might have been appropriate!” On the other
hand, given the conclusions of the sceptical paradox, there are no facts that would justify
us giving the answer ‘125’ as opposed to ‘5’! Indeed, for an individual in ‘isolation’, “the
‘assertability conditions that license an individual to say that, on a given occasion, he
ought to follow his rule this way rather than that, are, ultimately, that he does what he is
inclined to do.”27
Of course, as Kripke points out, the above is not our usual concept offollowing a
rule in general, and meaning in particular. We would like to be able to say whether a
person is in fact following some rule. As we emphasised earlier, following a rule is a
normative concept. So, there must be room for mistake. Thus, says Kripke, only if we
2h Kripke, p. 75.
Kripke, p. 88.27
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"widen our gaze” to a wider community, would we be able to bring normativity back into
rule-following.
It might be objected here that there is a certain tension between Kripke’s claim that
his solution is sceptical and the promise that normativity will be accounted for by an
appeal to some community of speakers. The problem is that in the development of the
sceptical paradox Kripke s rejection of such candidates for meaning-constitutive facts,
such as interpretations, dispositions and mental states, is ultimately based on the failure of
such candidates to account for the normative relationship predicates have with their
‘extension’. Now, it is not clear how a sceptical solution can resolve this difficulty. It
may be though that by calling his solution ‘sceptical’ Kripke meant to suggest that in fact
predicates do not have a normative relationship to their predicates, that is, that it
ultimately does not make sense to speak of some application of the predicate as ‘right’ or
‘wrong’. And some passages in Kripke’s discussion of the ‘sceptical solution’ seem to
support such an interpretation. “What follows from these assertability conditions is not
that the answer everyone gives to an addition problem is, by definition, the correct one,
but rather the platitude that if everyone agrees upon a certain answer, then no one will feel
justified in calling the answer wrong.”28 Now, if this is the reasoning behind Kripke’s
‘sceptical solution’, then Kripke’s entire project collapses into nonsense. The reason
Kripke felt justified in rejecting other views of meaning was precisely because they failed
to provide for normativity. If his solution fails this requirement as well, how is it better
2
* Kripke, p. 112.
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than other solutions discussed in the development of the ‘sceptical paradox’?! Any
solution to the ‘sceptical paradox’, if it is a solution at all, must explain how it is possible
that predicates have a normative relationship with their applications. So, I believe that the
only way to interpret Kripke’s communitarian solution is to regard it as an attempt to
provide for this normativity! Appeal to the community, unlike appeals to mental states, or
some basic interpretations, must explain how is it that only ‘125’ and not ‘5’ is the correct
answer to ‘68+57’, how is it that this and not that colour should be called ‘red’. This
solution may even be called ‘sceptical’ in a sense that Kripke may accept the sceptic’s
conclusions that there are no mental states which can account for normativity.
Community agreement is not a mental state and seems to be prima facia immune from the
sceptics attack on other meaning-constitutive facts. So, we may even continue to speak of
assertability conditions of utterances, as long as we do not misinterpret Kripke as
claiming that there is no normative relationship between predicates and their applications.
However, it is not clear how this ‘widening of our gaze’ is supposed to bring
normativity back to rule following. To explore this, Kripke starts with considerations of
the way children learn various rules, specifically the rule of addition. If a child gives the
‘wrong’ answer in simple cases of addition (i.e. not the answer that a teacher would give),
the teacher is entitled to think that a child is either “computing a different function” or
‘following no rule at all.”29 Only after the child starts giving, in enough cases, the answer
his teacher is inclined to give, can the teacher be justified in saying that the child has
29 Kripke, p. 80.
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mastered the rule. It is important to emphasise that the 'right' answer in this case is
simply the answer that the teacher is inclined to give.” Something quite similar
presumably happens in the case of adults. I shall quote Kripke at some length here to
illustrate the flow of his argument.
Jones is entitled, subject to correction by others
,
provisionally to say, “I mean
addition by ‘plus,” whenever he has the feeling of confidence-”now I can go on!”-
-that he can give correct responses in new cases; and he is entitled, again
provisionally and subject to correction by others, to judge a new response to be
‘correct’ simply because it is the response he is inclined to give. These inclinations
(both Jones general inclination that he has ‘got it and his particular inclination to
give particular answers in particular addition problems) are to be regarded as
primitive. They are not to be justified in terms of Jones’ ability to interpret his
own intentions or anything else. But Smith need not accept Jones’ authority on
these matters. Smith will judge Jones to mean addition by ‘plus’ only if he judges
that Jones’ answer to particular addition problems agree with those he is inclined
to give, or, if they occasionally disagree, he can interpret Jones as at least
following the proper procedure. ..If Jones consistently fails to give responses in
agreement (in this broad sense) with Smith’s, Smith will judge that he does not
mean addition by ‘plus ’. 31
In the above form this picture is, as Kripke himself recognises, completely
unacceptable. Simply because Smith disagrees with Jones, it does not prove that Jones is
not computing the addition function. Who is to say that Smith is using ‘plus’ correctly.
However, in reality we usually agree in our responses to addition problems and to many
other things as well. This fact, according to Kripke, is what makes one into an ‘adder’, a
member of the community of adders. So, the assertability conditions for such utterances
as ‘Jones is calculating the addition function’ are Jones’ membership in a community of
" Kripke, p. 90.
31 Kripke, p. 90-91.
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adders. As to the second requirement that every assertion have some utility in our lives,
the utility of us agreeing in our calculations is obvious. After all, if we expect to be paid
one dollar lor some unit of work, we would hope that upon completion of ‘68+57’ units
we would be paid 125 dollars, and not 5! In fact, when Kripke talks about the ‘role and
utility’ of our utterances, it appears that he really means the utility of our ‘agreement’ in
various judgements. And that seems to be unquestionable.
The above is a brief summary of the ‘sceptical solution’ that Kripke develops in
response to what he calls ‘Wittgenstein’s sceptical paradox’. The main points are as
follows. Given the conclusions of the sceptical paradox, there are no, and could not be
any, mental facts that would constitute our meaning ‘addition’ and not ‘quaddition’, or
anything else for that matter. Therefore, if we are to avoid the unacceptable conclusion
that language is impossible, we need to refashion our notion of meaning in terms of
communal agreement. Of course, when we consider an individual in ‘isolation’ we cannot
apply the test of communal agreement to his utterances. And since there are no mental
facts that would justify individuals utterances, but only brute inclinations to respond in one
way or another, whatever seems right to an individual is right. But this is not our ordinary
notion of rule-following (and meaning). We want to know what is the correct response,
not what is the response an individual is inclined to give. So, given that there are no
mental facts to provide us with such normativity, we cannot consider an individual in
isolation. Instead, we ought to consider the individual as part of a community of rule
followers.
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It an individual's responses accord with those of the community, he is justified in making
them. Only, as a participant in practices of the community can we talk of an individual
meaning anything.
As the sceptical paradox itself has been a highly controversial piece of literature, so
is the sceptical solution
. Numerous authors raised a variety of objections to every aspect
of this solution. 32 It seems to me, however, that the problems with Kripke’s solution go
beyond particular aspects of it, and the solution seems to be misguided at the very
fundamental level. As was discussed in the previous section, the motivation behind the
‘sceptical paradox’ lay in our inability to find a fact in virtue of which predicates have
meaning, in virtue of which certain applications of the predicate are ’right’ and others are
‘wrong’. Every candidate we considered to be such a fact in the discussion of the
‘sceptical paradox’ failed to meet this requirement because there could not be any
determinate interpretation of such fact which would somehow assure the correct
application of the predicate. And hence the conclusion of the paradox is that there is
nothing ‘in between’ a predicate and its application that can provide for the normativity
relationship. Yet, after stating these conclusions Kripke goes on to propose a solution
according to which an appeal to community agreement can provide for this normative
relationship. The solution provides that my judgement that this 1 object is red is justified
only if some wider community is inclined to call this same object ‘red’. Even without
considering particular arguments, it must be clear that this appeal to community agreement
Most notably: Baker and Hacker [1984], David Pears [1988], Simon Blackburn [1984], John McDowell
[ 1984], David Stern [1995], and Crispin Wright [1984],
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is neither logically implied in my judgement that, say, tomatoes are red (or that the answer
to -68+57’ is ‘125’), nor is an appeal to community agreement immune from the same
sceptical doubt that brought the downfall of the other candidates for meaning-constitutive
tacts. Indeed, it seems to me, that this failure of the ‘community agreement’ to account
tor normativity, ultimately reduces Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ to simply an appeal to the
notion that only the primitive inclinations of an individual can provide normativity. But as
Kripke himself has previously argued in his discussion of the ‘sceptical paradox’, primitive
inclinations cannot provide for this normative relationship between predicates and their
applications!
With the problem thus clarified, we can see the trouble with Kripke’s ‘sceptical
solution’. The trouble is, of course, that ‘widening our gaze to a wider community’ does
not provide us with the requisite normativity!
First, it must be clear that at least in our ordinary discourse when we say that
This colour is ‘green’ or ‘Jones does not understand the meaning of the plus sign’, there
is no reference to any community agreement. Even if under the influence of some drug
everyone around me starts to call cucumbers ‘purple’ I would be justified in defiantly
continuing to call them ‘green’. Even if everyone agrees with Jones that the answer to the
addition problem ‘68+57’ is ‘5’, I may still insist that either he has made a mistake or that
he does not understand the rule of addition. Of course, this is not to say that there could
not be another language, another form of life 33
,
in which the term ‘right’ meant ‘same as
33
For a detailed discussion of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘form of life’ see Lynne Baker, “On the Very Idea
of a Form of Life.” Inquiry 27 (1984): 277-289.
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what everyone says’ or the term ‘green’ was correctly applied to eggplants and not
cucumbers. There is no difficulty in imagining such language. However, as Kripke
himself recognises in a footnote, in our language to say that some response to a
mathematical problem is ‘right’ or ‘correct’ is not to say that this is the response everyone
else gives. 4 I call cucumbers ‘green’ because they are this T colour, I respond with ‘125’
and not ‘5’ to an addition problem because I know what it is to add two numbers, and
there is absolutely no role that community agreement has to play here.
The second difficulty with Kripke’s attempt to account for normativity by an
appeal to ‘community agreement’ is that, ultimately, the sceptical doubt that brought
down such candidates for meaning-constitutive facts as mental pictures and dispositions is
applicable to Kripke’s communitarian account of meaning. After all, when considered in
isolation, as Kripke points out, all we have are primitive inclinations which, almost by
definition, do not have any justificatory character. Now, if my rule following is subject to
such doubt, why is not the usage of 10, 20 or a million individuals just like myself subject
to the same doubt?! A million deaf people evaluating the Brandenburg Concertos are no
better than one deaf person doing it, and the agreement between this million would not tell
us anything useful about Bach.
First, as in the case of the individual rule-follower the totality ofprevious
responses of a community cannot assure normativity. Suppose we consider not only the
responses of the lone adder Jones, but of his friend Smith as well. To say that Jones’
response is the correct one, only if it agrees with the answer Smith is inclined to give,
'4 Kripke, p. 112, 87n.
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seems to grossly flout our intuitive understanding of justification. In what way is Smith’s
primitive inclination different from Jones’ that it has such sweeping normative powers?
Clearly, there is no such distinction (unless, of course we simply postulate it). How do we
know that Smith’s inclination is the correct one?
Kripke, of course, recognises that there is nothing normative about Smith’s
inclinations, but claims that the fact that we (Jones, Smith, Brown, you, me, etc.) actually
agree in our judgements supplies finally the normative condition we were seeking. Each
one ot us, to become a member of the community, goes through certain rites of passage.
It our responses, for example, in the case of addition, agree in enough cases with the
responses of the larger community, we are admitted into the community as an adder.
Similarly, we join a community of readers, writers, speakers, etc. The problem with this
expansion, is of course the same as with the previous ones; the normative element is still
missing. Kripke sets up his sceptical paradox by imagining a case of addition which an
individual never computed before. He then goes on to claim that, given all the facts about
an individual’s behaviour and mental life, we cannot discern which function he is
computing. Ail of these facts are compatible with the individual’s computing any number
of different functions. Now, it is certainly conceivable that there is some sum that nobody
in the community has calculated; we can even imagine that nobody has calculated the sum
of 57 and 68. How would our agreement in ‘actual’ cases help us determine which
function we are computing? Clearly all our communal behaviour is compatible with any
number of distinct functions. Importantly, this objection does not depend on what might
be viewed as simply a dramatic device which Kripke uses in the development of the
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sceptical paradox
. The point is perfectly general, there are no facts beyond our
agreement that the answer is ‘125’, that would tell us whether we are computing the
addition or the quaddition function. And of course ‘agreement’ itself may be construed
in any number of non-standard ways. Perhaps by ‘agreement’ we always meant
schmugreement
,
where to schmugree is to.... So, it seems that the totality of actual
applications that community makes of some predicate cannot determine in new cases, the
coriect application. All of our applications of the term ‘green’ are compatible with the
hypothesis that by ‘green’ we mean grue, where ‘grue’ is defined as ‘green until year 2000
AD. and blue afterward’. 35
Nor can we say, that what assures normativity is not the totality of actual
responses but our communal dispositions to use a certain predicate. As was demonstrated
by Kripke himself, individual’s dispositions cannot provide the normativity we require.
How would communal dispositions accomplish this task?! A community consists of
individuals and some of the individuals have mistaken dispositions, i.e. dispositions to
apply predicates to objects that are not in the extension of a predicate (or use a predicate
in the way which does not accord with such predicate’s use). In fact, there is no difficulty
in imagining a case in which most members of the community have dispositions to apply
predicates on some occasions in a way that does not accord with their correct usage.
The community I submit, however exactly specified, is bound to exhibit precisely
the same duality of dispositions that I do: it too will be disposed to call both
horses and deceptively horsy looking cows on dark nights ‘horse’. After all, if I
can be taken in by a deceptively horsy looking cow on a dark night, what is to
'5 As widely known, the term ‘grue’ was introduced by Nelson Goodman in Fact. Fiction, and Forecasts
(3
rd
ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).
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prevent 17,000 people just like me from being taken in by the same, admittedly
effective, impostor? The point is that many of the mistakes we make are
systematic : they arise because of the presence of features-bad lighting, effective
disguises, and so forth-that have a generalizable and predictable effect on
creatures with similar cognitive endowments. (This is presumably what makes
'magicians’ possible). But, then, any of my dispositions that are in this sense
systematically mistaken, are bound to be duplicated at the level of the community.
The communitarianism, however, cannot call them mistakes
,
for they are
community’s dispositions. He must insist, then, firm conviction to the contrary
notwithstanding, that ‘horse’ means not horse but, rather, horse or cow. i6
So, it seems that the appeal to community dispositions instead of actual responses
cannot assure the normative relationship between predicates and their applications. It may
be objected that in the above discussion we have not paid due attention to the second
component of the ‘sceptical solution’: the utility of meaningful utterances. Indeed, Kripke
insists that unless there is a certain useful role that practice plays in our lives, the practice
cannot be called ‘meaningful’. As far as I can discern, the idea here is simply that there is
a certain utility to our agreement in regards to various judgements. It is hard however to
see how this utility is supposed to bestow the necessary normative element on our
practices. Suppose our community-wide usage of 'up' and 'down' has been switched
overnight. 37 You board an aeroplane, you sit 'up' into your seat and get ready to enjoy the
flight. However, two minutes later you find yourself and two hundred other fellow
passengers plunging into the ocean. The problem is, of course, that aeroplane controls
were made before this communal shift in usage of 'up and 'down'. So, instead of going f
when moved into the 'down' position.. .the aeroplane went down. Naturally in this case.
1(1
Paul Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations”, (Mind . 98, 1989), p. 536.
David Pears considers a similar example. See, The False Prison , v.2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988),
p. 369.
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we would not want to say that the community use is the standard of correctness of
application of such terms as 'up' and 'down'. Although the utility of agreement in our lives
is unquestionable, the fact that we may all agree in particular application of a predicate
does not assure that this particular application is the correct one. And clearly, in this
particular case, the utility of our agreement is extremely marginal indeed/*
What seems to emerge from the above considerations is that ‘community
agreement cannot account for the normative relationship that predicates have with their
applications. In some sense, an appeal to ‘community agreement’ is similar to an appeal to
Platonic functions. Even if it made sense to speak of ‘community agreement’ determining
answers for every use of a predicate, how would we have access to these answers? How
is it possible for Jones to appeal to ‘community agreement’ to justify his response in
particular circumstances? Certainly not by asking his friend Smith, Smith can be wrong
about which answer is sanctioned by ‘community agreement’. How many people does
Jones have to ask to ascertain which answer is sanctioned by the community?! But even if
Jones somehow would ‘get hold’ of the communal answer, how can he be sure that he
understood it correctly? After all, as was persuasively argued by Kripke himself, every
mental state, picture, rule-formulation, etc. can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
It is important to clarify this point. I am not claiming that it is possible for us to consistently disagree
about the meaning of the predicates we use. Even in the example considered above, the crucial condition
is the ‘overnight’ change of use. After all, it is perfectly possible for us to gradually come to use ‘up’ to
mean down, and vice-versa. This would involve, among other things, changing the way we explain and
use these words (e.g. pointing to an aeroplane that just took off and saying ‘down’, by telling a child to
‘look up when walking’ etc.). The point of this example was to show that the brute fact that we agree in
most circumstance does not by itself provide the standard of correctness for the use of predicates , nor does
it necessarily follow that such agreement has utility in all circumstances.
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How would Jones know that the answer he is inclined to give would accord with one
‘sanctioned’ by the community agreement?
Surprisingly, Kripke does not seem opposed to the claim that ‘community
agreement’ is not something even a non-isolated person can appeal to for justification.
According to Kripke, even in the context of communal practice what ‘entitles’ us to
lespond in a certain way are the same primitive inclinations’ that characterise responses of
the ‘individuals considered in isolation’! But isn’t this the view of meaning explicitly
rejected by the sceptical paradox! Let us again look at the paragraph quoted earlier.
Jones is entitled
,
subject to correction by others, provisionally to say, “I mean
addition by ‘plus’,” whenever he has the feeling of confidence--”now I can go
on!”--that he can give ‘correct’ responses in new cases; and he is entitled, again
provisionally and subject to correction by others, to judge a new response to be
‘correct’ simply because it is the response he is inclined to give. 39(my underlining)
As we saw, such clauses as ‘subject to correction by others’ can do very little to provide
us with the normative element. So, what seems to be doing the work here is simply the
‘feeling’ of confidence and the ‘inclination’ to give a certain answer. In other words, what
Kripke ‘sceptical solution’ seems to be reduced to proposing that ultimately our
inclinations are the ones that provide us with the normative element. It is because we have
a ‘feeling’ of confidence that we are calculating the addition function, we are entitled to
say that we are in fact calculating it. It is because we are ‘inclined’ to give the answer
‘125’ to ‘68+57’, that it is the ‘correct’ answer!
Even before we evaluate the “merits” of this solution to the sceptical paradox, we
"’Kripke, p. 90-91.
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must note a certain tension in the statement of this “solution”. 40 As Kripke repeatedly
points out, the sceptical paradox is not about whether ‘125’ is the correct answer to
•68+57’, “this much is a theorem of arithmetic.”41 The paradox is about which function I
mean when I use the term ‘plus’. So, it seems somewhat superficial to say that we need
an inclination to determine what is the correct answer to ‘68+57’. Given that we mean
‘addition’ the answer is predetermined by the function itself. This is of course a decidedly
Platonistic view of mathematical functions, a view with which Wittgenstein is sure to
disagree. However, given that Kripke holds such a view, this inclination seems to be an
‘idle wheel’. As long as we have the ‘feeling’ that we are doing addition, we should be all
set in regards to the answers of particular addition problems.
The main point should not be obscured by the unfortunate complexity of the
mathematical example. What ultimately justifies my calling this! object a ‘table’ is having
some primitive mental state (e.g. inclination to call this thing a ‘table’, feeling confident
that ‘table’ is the appropriate term for this object, etc.)! So, ultimately we are back where
we started, positing mental states to explain how is it that ‘125’ and not ‘5’ is the right
answer to ‘68+57’, or that this and not that object should be called ‘table’.
If this is Kripke’s solution, it can hardly be the solution to the ‘sceptical paradox’.
Kripke dedicates a large portion of his discussion of the paradox to showing that no
feeling/inclination can have any place in determining whether I mean plus or quus.
40 The discussion of this ‘tension’ is based on Arthur Collins’ article. See, Arthur Collins “On the
Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein”, The Wittgenstein Legacy: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.
.XVII (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).
41
Kripke, p. 82. (see also pp. 12, 13).
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The idea that each ot my inner states-including, presumably, meaning what I do by
plus -has its own special discernible quality like headache, a tickle, or the
experience of blue after-image, is indeed one of the cornerstones of classical
empiricism. Cornerstone it may be, but it is very hard to see how the alleged
introspectible quale could be relevant to the problem at hand
.
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And ot course, to say that this feeling/inclination is not an occurrent mental state, but a
disposition would not help in the least. As we saw, Kripke rejects the dispositional view
of meaning as failing to provide the normativity we expect from our concepts of rule-
following and meaning. “Precisely the fact that our answer to the question of which
function I meant is justificatory of my present response is ignored in the dispositional
account and leads to all its difficulties .”43
The conclusions that we ought to reach after the above considerations is that
Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ is insufficient to stand up to the sceptic’s challenge. It does
not have the requisite ‘justificatory’ element required by the sceptic. In fact, Kripke’s
‘sceptical solution’ seems to be reduced to an appeal to ‘primitive inclinations’ as the
element that provides for normativity, while such an appeal is explicitly proscribed by the
conclusions of the discussion of the ‘sceptical paradox’. It seems to me, that the deeper
issue here is not that Kripke was not up to the task, and that a more carefully crafted
‘sceptical solution’ could resolve the sceptical paradox. Rather, despite correctly
interpreting, as I shall claim, Wittgenstein’s criticisms of various theories of meaning,
Kripke misinterprets his conclusions.
42
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To say that there is neither mental nor Platonic entities or facts that are meaning-
constitutive, is not to say that predicates have no meaning, or that there is no fact of the
matter whether Jones understands the meaning of the term ‘table’, or that the community
somehow determines whether ‘125’ and not ‘5’ is the correct response to ‘68+57’. The
main point of Wittgenstein’s criticisms is to overturn the picture of meaning that
postulates some intermediary (whether mental states, interpretations, or community
agreement) in virtue of which predicates have normative relationship to their ‘extension’.
Normative relationships do not require such an intermediary, Wittgenstein claims. These
are the main conclusions of Wittgenstein’s discussion in the sections preceding §243 of
Philosophical Investigations, as we shall see. Yet, Kripke takes this fact as somehow
detrimental to the whole notion of normative language. Hence, confusion ensues when he
attempts to resolve this ‘radical’ paradox.
And it is not surprising that he fails. In an attempt to salvage our language in the
face of what he takes to be the final blow to the normative idea of language, he employs
the assertability conditional analysis of meaning. Yet, recognising the inadequacy of
these assertability conditions to explain our ordinary adherence to the normativity of
meaning (i.e. we ordinarily think we are not simply justified in saying that the answer to
‘68+57’ is ‘125’, but we are right in giving such an answer), he appeals to community
agreement to salvage this ordinary notion. However, this attempt fails since community
agreement is no better suited to provide this normativity than are the mental states Kripke
discusses in the development of the sceptical paradox. So, ultimately Kripke’s ‘sceptical
solution’ is reduced to relying on the individual’s primitive inclinations to provide for the
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normativity we require of the predicates in our language. And as was shown by Kripke’s
own criticisms of the various theories of meanings in the development of the ‘sceptical
paradox’, this appeal to primitive inclinations cannot provide for the normativity we
expect from our predicates. Hence we must investigate Wittgenstein’s own treatment of
the issues discussed by Kripke, and see whether Wittgenstein has a solution which would
avert the radical conclusion that meaningful language is impossible.
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CHAPTER 2
Section I
At this point we might ask the following question: What does this discussion of
Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’ and the failure of ‘sceptical solution’ have to do with
Wittgenstein? After all, is it not an almost received view44 that Kripke’s discussion in
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has virtually nothing to do with
Wittgenstein’s own discussion in Philosophical Investigations? This may indeed be the
received line, yet it does not seem to me that Kripke s interpretation can be dismissed so
readily. In fact, in what follows, I shall argue that Kripke’s discussion and criticism of the
various meaning theories is strikingly similar to Wittgenstein’s own discussion in the
sections preceding §243 of Philosophical Investigations. Furthermore, Wittgenstein
provides a solution to the difficulties raised by the considerations of the various theories of
meaning; namely to the problem that not one of the theories of meaning examined can
provide us with the meaning-constitutive facts of the kind required. More specifically, he
explains how a normative relationship between predicates and their applications/uses is
possible.
Wittgenstein’s proposed solution to these difficulties, however, is very different
from Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ described above. To anticipate, Wittgenstein does not
claim that the normative relationship between predicates and their objects is assured by
community agreement or by our primitive inclinations to respond in certain ways.
44
See, Baker and Hacker [1984], Blackburn [1984], Shanker [1984], etc.
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According to Wittgenstein, there is no third entity, whether mental or Platonic, that
constitutes our meaning. Such entities do not and cannot ‘assure’ the normative
relationship between predicates and their application. Predicates have this normative
relationship to their applications in virtue of being ‘internally’ related to their extension, so
that there is no room for doubt about whether a particular application is in accord with the
meaning of a particular predicate.
In this chapter I have two goals. First, I intend to offer a sketch of the way
Wittgenstein discusses various theories of meaning in the sections preceding §243 of the
Philosophical Investigations. It seems to me that the overall reluctance on the part of
other commentators to recognize the legitimacy (to a degree) of Kripke’s interpretation is
due to Kripke’s failure to connect his discussion in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language and Wittgenstein’s own argument in Philosophical Investigations. And I hope
that by giving an outline of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the matter, we can give a more
stable footing to Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Second, I shall present what I
believe to be Wittgenstein’s own resolution of the apparent difficulties in cashing out our
ordinary notion of meaning, and, more specifically, his answer to the question of how
predicates can have a normative relationship with their applications.
An important point must be emphasised before I begin. The sketch that I give
should in no way be taken as an exegesis of the pre §243 sections of Philosophical
Investigations. An adequate exegesis of these sections alone would take hundreds of
pages, and is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the purpose of my sketch is
simply to point out a single theme among the multitude that run through these sections. It
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seems to me that Kripke’s interpretation closely reflects a certain strain in Wittgenstein’s
discussion and criticism of various theories of meaning. Furthermore, given the purpose
ot this sketch, I shall not attempt to evaluate various aspects of his criticism of the various
meaning theories. Again, an adequate assessment of the variety of criticisms Wittgenstein
proposes in these sections, as illustrated by the extensive secondary literature, is not
something that can be undertaken in such limited space.
As Wittgenstein anticipates from the very first section of Philosophical
Investigations, the question of meaning will be one of the important threads binding his
investigation. The first notion of meaning he considers is that ‘meaning’ is simply “the
object for which the word stands .”45 Although he singles out St. Augustine as the
originator of this idea, it is well known that there is a long philosophical tradition behind
this picture. In fact, even though no one in the modern philosophical tradition holds this
picture of meaning, at least in this simple form, Wittgenstein would argue that this picture
has insidiously permeated the more sophisticated modern theories of meaning. Although
these theories vary greatly, there is something that ties them all together-for example, the
view that meaning is some sort of entity, either mental, abstract, or physical. And words
in our natural languages simply happened to signify such entities. And it is one of the
main projects of the Philosophical Investigations, to demolish this mistaken picture.
Wittgenstein begins with the simple Augustinian picture (SAP) as described above.
Meanings are objects for which the words stand, and they are given by ostensive
45 Wittgenstein [1981], §1.
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definitions. As it turns out, after a brief investigation, such picture cannot account for the
normativity of meaning. First, depending on circumstance and training “same ostensive
teaching of.. .words would have effected a quite different understanding .”46 That is, simply
pointing to some object and saying a word can hardly give the word a meaning. Suppose I
want to teach a child the meaning of the term ‘two’ and point to a group of two nuts, this
act ot pointing, by itself, would not teach me the meaning of the word ‘two’. A child may
suppose that ‘two’ is the name of this group of nuts, or of a particular colour, or anything
else .
47
“An ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case .”48 However,
this difficulty can not be simply rectified by adding some sortal, e.g. ‘This number is called
‘two’, or ‘This colour is called ‘purple’. Although this caveat may sometimes avert the
misunderstanding “when the overall role of the word in language is clear”49
,
words like
‘number’, ‘colour’, ‘length’, etc., may be subject to the same difficulty of multiplicity of
interpretations. “But is there only one way of taking the word ‘colour’ or ‘length ’?”50
The purpose of the remarks was, of course, not simply to show that ostensive
definitions are neither sufficient nor essential criteria by which we can ascertain the
meaning of a word, the point is much more far-reaching. After all, even when we manage
to attach a word to some object (which we do all the time), this object cannot be the
46
Wittgenstein [1981], §6.
47
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meaning of the term. The argument is fairly straightforward and may be stated as follows:
1
. If the SAP is true, sentences like ‘Julius Caesar died in 44 BC’ are meaningless.
2. Sentences like ‘Julius Caesar died in 44 BC’ are not meaningless.
3. /SAP is not true.
“When Mr. N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning
dies.” 51 Furthermore, as Wittgenstein points out, there are clearly expressions in our
language which have a role and may be used in a meaningful discourse (e.g. ‘round-
square’ or ‘goose that laid the golden eggs’) even though they cannot be applied to a
particular object. 52 These points underscore that such phenomenon as naming itself is only
possible within a framework of language practice and that any talk of meaning divorced
from the context of use of words in a language is impossible. Hence, “For a large class of
cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus:
the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” 53 It is at this point that the investigation
shifts from the consideration of a simple Augustinian picture of language to the more
sophisticated theories of meaning. Wittgenstein understood well that by pointing out the
fact that talk of meaning must be anchored (in some way) to the use of words in language,
or saying ‘meaning of a word is its use’, while it might underscore the nonsensical nature
of the simple Augustinian picture, it may also lead to an even greater confusion and
misunderstanding. As I think will become clear, one of the central points Wittgenstein
11 Wittgenstein [1981], §40.
52 Wittgenstein [1981], §42.
Wittgenstein [1981], §43.
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attempts to make is to show that meaning is not to be identified with any entity mediating
between words and their application. In some sense, there is nothing more to meaning of
particular predicates than the use we make of them in our language. Yet, even thoush, the
more sophisticated theories of meaning seem to acknowledge the importance of the notion
of use, they take this fact in the wrong spirit as it were.
Driven by the idea that meaning must be some sort of entity, they attempt to
account for a predicate’s use by postulating some mysterious fact/state that somehow
determines, in one way or another, all of the future uses of a predicate. And it is the
argument against this fundamental assumption which lies behind these more
‘sophisticated’ theories of meaning, that occupies a large part of the pre and post §243
discussion of Philosophical Investigations. This argument purports to show that not only
are there no such entities as ‘meaning’, but also that no entity could account for the
normative character of the relationship between words and their extension/use. It is these
considerations that seem to me to provide a unifying thread of the extremely complex, and
multifaceted discussion that precedes section 243, if not of the whole of Philosophical
Investigations.
And as we shall see Wittgenstein’s discussion is organised along roughly the same
lines as was presented by Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language! As
Kripke claimed Wittgenstein discusses and rejects a number of the theories of meaning as
failing to adequately account for the normative relationship that predicates have with their
applications. Just as Kripke’s sceptic (although not in the spirit of scepticism),
Wittgenstein concludes that no entity can account for the normative relationship between
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predicates and their application. However, unlike Kripke, Wittgenstein does not propose
a communitarian sceptical solution
. His solution, although seemingly more radical, is
much more plausible and seems to be the only solution that can account for normativity.
Wittgenstein s strategy is two horned. On the negative side, in investigating
\aiious theories of meaning, he attempts to show that there is no particular entity that can
be found behind every predicate which is responsible for its meaning. And even if there
were such an entity it could not, logically, account for the normative relationship which
words have with their use.
‘Final’ (Basic) Interpretation View
The first type of theory of meaning is the view that the meaning of a term is given by what
we earlier called some ‘final’ (basic) interpretation of a term. In §51 after briefly
considering and rejecting a slightly more sophisticated version of a simple Augustinian
picture, the view that words signify simples, Wittgenstein poses the following question:
...but what does it mean to say that in the technique of using the language certain
elements correspond to signs?-Is it that the person who is describing the
complexes of coloured squares always says 'R’ where there is a red square; ‘B’
when there is a black one, and so on? But if he goes wrong in the description and
mistakenly says ‘R’ where he sees a black square-what is the criterion by which
this is a mistakel-Or does ‘R’s standing for red square consists in this, that when
the people whose language it is use the sign ‘R’ a red square always comes before
their minds?54
This is where Wittgenstein begins his inquiry into the more “sophisticated” theories
of meaning. And not surprisingly, he begins it from considerations of a particular kind of
54 Wittgenstein [1981], §51
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final interpretation’ view of meaning
-what may be called the ‘picture’ theory of
meaning. This theory does not only seem to be the most natural one, it has a long
philosophical tradition behind it. However, the problems that haunted the simple
Augustinian picture, seem to haunt this view of meaning as well. How are we to know
what objects/uses a ‘picture in our mind’ corresponds to? In §73 Wittgenstein imagines a
picture of a ‘schematic leaf as constituting the meaning of the term ‘leaf. But what is
this a picture of? Is it a picture of a ‘schematic leaf or, say the picture of the shape of a
particular leaf?55 Or, might we not think it to be a sample of a particular shade of green,
or of a certain shape? The difficulty here, as before, is that there is nothing about such a
picture which determines my meaning, i.e. whether by the expression ‘leaf I mean a leaf, a
paiticular colour, a shape, or something else. The only way we can determine what this
picture and the word associated with it should be applied to is through the way it is
used. 56 And there is nothing about such a picture that determines the way it ought to be
used.
And it would not help, as considered in §139-141, to claim that not only the
picture but “also the method of projection comes before our mind.” Would this ‘method
of projection’ make such a picture into a ‘final’ interpretation? Clearly not. There is a
myriad of ways in which we can interpret the picture of a cube with lines connecting it to
another cube (the method of projection). So, upon hearing/uttering the word ‘cube’, we
Wittgenstein [1981], §74.
y
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may apply it to two-cubed structures connected by wires, pieces of paper with black lines
drawn on them, combinations of connected planks, etc. So, clearly even in this case there
is nothing about this picture, even when complete with the ‘method of projection’, that
can determine the meaning of the word cube.
Indeed, “can’t it be clearly seen here that it is absolutely inessential for the picture
to exist...”-
7
for our determination of meaning of the term cube. “What is essential to see
that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application
still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.” 58 This is
an extremely important point which has ramifications beyond the discussion of the
‘picture-theory’ of meaning. Wittgenstein alludes here to the fact that the grammar of the
words such as ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ does not imply any entity, whether a picture,
a verbal formulation, or some mysterious mental state. “For even supposing I had found
something that happened in ail those cases of understanding-why should it be the
understanding.”59 The criteria for such notions as meaning and understanding are “much
more complicated than might appear at the first sight.”60 Yet, these criteria do not include
the existence of some entity, mediating between words and their use. Wittgenstein uses
the extensive discussion (§ 1 56-§ 178) of reading to illustrate precisely this point. The gist
of the discussion is that the grammar of the word ‘reading’ does not commit us to any
57 Wittgenstein [1981], §141.
Wittgenstein [1981], §140.
5y Wittgenstein [1981], §153.
60 Wittgenstein [1981], §182.
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particular fact which must obtain in ail cases of reading. No special feeling, image, or
action is essential to the act ot reading. And yet, in most circumstances we have no
problem in deciding whether a person is reading or say reciting words memorised by heart.
Given these considerations, it must be clear that not only can the ‘picture-theory’
ot meaning not account for the normative relationship between the word and it
applications, but also that no such picture is presupposed by the grammar of the term
‘meaning’.
And clearly no other sorts of interpretations would be any better suited to provide
for normativity. Why should we think that the meaning of the order ‘Bring me a broom’,
is found in a sentence ‘Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted to it’? In
what sense is the latter the “more fundamental form [which] alone shews what is meant by
the other ...”61 Can we not misinterpret this latter sentence?! Does there exist a picture,
formulation, or a rule that we cannot misinterpret? “Does the sign-post [rule formulation,
definition, etc.] leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?...And if there were, not a
single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground-is there
only one way of interpreting them?”62 Wittgenstein claims clearly not, “for any general
definition can be misunderstood too .”63
<’ i Wittgenstein [1981], §63.
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Mental-State View
Given the failure of the picture-theory’ of meaning, Wittgenstein asks a broader question.
Does it make sense to speak of meaning as a state at all, and particularly as a mental state.
And the answer, as you may anticipate, is the same as in the case of the ‘picture-theory’ of
meaning. It does not make sense to speak of mental states of meaning since not only can
they not account for the normative relationship that obtains between the words and then-
applications, but the existence of such states of meaning would contradict the clearly
conceived grammar of such terms as ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’.
If the meaning of a predicate, is not given by some final interpretation perhaps it is
given (embodied) by some other mental state which makes the normative connection by
actually ‘containing’, in some sense, all the applications of the predicate in itself. But what
would that mean? It is true that we say that we “understand the meaning of a word when
we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash...” But does this imply that we grasp all of the
applications of the predicate in an instant? In what way can such an instantaneous state
contain all the infinite applications of a predicate? Is it that “the act of meaning the order
had in its own way traversed all those steps; that when you meant it your mind as it were
flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one.”64 So,
the moment you understand the meaning of ‘+2’ your mind somehow gets hold of the
whole series of numbers, including such steps as 1002, 10004, 300008, etc. This is of
course is absurd. In what way can such finite state ‘traverse’ all the infinite steps in a
flash?!
M Wittgenstein [19811, §188.
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Even if we waive this infinity’ problem, difficulties remain. How can such a
mental state contain any objects/applications of some predicate? Is it like some symbolic
machine which contains its future movements in some mysterious way like “objects which
are already lying in the drawer and which we take out .”65 And, it is not that the future
movements of this ideal machine are simply causally determined, since it “could also have
moved differently .” 66 (parts ‘bending, breaking off, melting’, etc.). Nor can such a
machine ‘contain’ its future movements in virtue of having some picture of the movement -
-for such a picture would have to be a picture of just this movement. But the possibility of
this movement must be the possibility of just this movement .”67 That is, as we discussed
earlier, any picture could be interpreted in infinitely many ways. Instead, the future
movement of such machine must be contained in it “far more determinately than in the
actual machine .”68 But this picture seems to be no more than a confusion. Neither is the
possibility of movement contained in this mysterious way in any physical machine, nor are
the applications of the predicate contained by some mysterious state. And so, our view of
meaning which is modelled on such machine is nothing more than a confusion. “In our
failure to understand the use of the word, we take it as the expression of a queer
process
' ,69
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In our taiJure to understand the notion of meaning of a predicate, we take it to be some
queer process of grasping all the applications of the predicate in a flash.
Furthermore, the discussion of the grammar of such terms as ‘meaning’ and
understanding applies to the case where meaning is conceived of as some mysterious
state containing all of the applications of a predicate. The grammar of the term ‘meaning’
is very different from the grammar of such mental state terms as pain, excitement or
depression.
Depression, excitement, pain, are called mental states. Carry out a
grammatical investigation as follows: we say
“He was depressed all day”.
“He is in great pain all day.”
“He has been in continuous pain since yesterday.”
We also say “Since yesterday I have understood this word.”
“Continuously,” though?—To be sure one can speak of interruption of
understanding. But in what cases? Compare: “When did your pains got less?”
and “When did you stop understanding this word?”
(b) Suppose it were asked: “When do you know how to play chess? All
the time? or just while your making a move? And the whole of chess during each
move?-How queer that knowing how to play chess should take such a short time,
and a game so much longer ! 70
It would not make sense, as it is implied above, to predicate, for example, duration or
degree in the way we predicate these things of mental states. “In the sense in which there
are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding,
understanding is not a mental process
.
(A pain’s growing more or less; the hearing of a
tune or a sentence these are mental processes .)”
71
Just as it does not make sense to ask of
711 Wittgenstein [1981], p. 59.
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a pupil after he continues to reproduce written words correctly, what was the “first word
in his new state [of reading]” 7\ so it does not make sense to ask a person when he found
himself in possession of a certain mental state of understanding (although it does make
sense to ask when a person understood a certain term). If we have to compare the terms
such as 'meaning’ and 'understanding’ to anything, it would be such terms as ‘is able to’,
'can’, etc .
73
So, as it must be clear by now, Wittgenstein believes that there are serious
difficulties, both logical and grammatical, in identifying meaning with any sort of mental
state. We must conclude then that none of the more sophisticated theories of meaning
considered, fares better than the original Augustinian picture. Must we then conclude that
words do not have meanings, that all we have are mere noises and random actions only
tentatively associated with these noises?!
Section II
So, what is Wittgenstein’s defence against this “paradox”, what is Wittgenstein’s
solution? Naturally, the answer is not found in some definitive statement at the end of a
reductio. All through the investigation of various meaning theories, Wittgenstein provided
various statements, intimations, sign-post that direct us towards the answer. In fact, for
each theory of meaning considered (Simple Augustinian picture, the picture/interpretation
view, mental state view), Wittgenstein points out that we make the same mistake, we
72
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identify meaning with some sort of entity (state, experience, etc.,). Already in the first
section of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein in discussing a simple order to get
five apples, envisages the following exchange:
Interlocutor: But what is the meaning of the word ‘five’?
Wittgenstein: No such thing was in question here, only how the word ‘five’ is
used . 74
Although, at this stage it is not clear what exactly is meant by this interchange, in light of
what follows we may safely conclude that Wittgenstein is not questioning the legitimacy of
ordinary ‘meaning-talk’ (This would be the ultimate anti-Wittgensteinian project).
Instead, in this very first section, Wittgenstein outlines the fundamental flaw in the theories
of meaning which he goes on to consider; the view that to mean or understand words in
our language we need to get hold of some special object called ‘meaning’. He proceeds to
discuss what we called the simple Augustinian picture (SAP) of meaning, and points out
that according to this theory, the word ‘meaning’ is used in an illicit way. “Let us first
discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to
it. -It is important to note that the word ‘meaning’ is being used illicitly if it is used to
signify the thing that ‘corresponds’ to the word .” 75 According to SAP, each word is a
name with the meaning being simply the object to which such name applies.
74 Wittgenstein [1981], §1. The above of course is not a direct quote.
75 Wittgenstein [1981], §40.
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The seemingly more plausible picture/interpretation theory commits the same
fallacy; it identifies meaning with some special kind of interpretation. And it is against this
that Wittgenstein warns us that there is a way of grasping a rule (understanding/knowing
the meaning of a word) which is not an interpretation ..."16 Finally, in his discussion of the
mental state view of meaning Wittgenstein asks: “But wait-if ‘Now I understand the
principle’ does not mean the same as The formula.. ..occurs to me’. ..does it follow from
this that I employ the sentence ‘Now I understand ’ or ‘Now I can go on’ as a
description of a process occurring behind or side by side with that of saying the formula?”
The implied answer is clearly no, in fact, Wittgenstein implores us to “try not to think of
understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all--For that is the expression that confuses you .”77
The picture that is implied in every theory of meaning discussed above is as
follows: “You say the point isn’t the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning
as a thing of the same kind as a word, though also different from the word. Here the
word, there the meaning. The money and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast:
money, and its use)”78
It seems to me that in this passage Wittgenstein comes closest to stating his
“theory” of meaning (to actually state such a theory would of course be against the
method of Philosophical Investigations). And the theory is quite simple. Meaning is not
an entity which mediates between words and their use. Words have meanings, the
7h Wittgenstein [1981], §201.
’ Wittgenstein [1981], §154.
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meanings that words have are exhibited in the way we apply these predicates, by the
examples given in teaching these words, by the rules we give in explaining their usage, in
short in the way we use them. Indeed, one of the greatest achievements of Wittgenstein’s
therapy was to show the true variety of the ways in which words are used, the true
variety of language games. Hence, it is not surprising that the way in which words have
meanings reflects this variety. The meaning of the word ‘red’ is exhibited in our applying
the word to various objects, in our explaining how ‘red’ must be used, in our specifying
circumstances in which ‘red’ must not be employed (e.g. we cannot use ‘red’ in such
sentences as “The number five is red’), etc. ‘But then doesn’t our understanding reach
beyond all the examples?’-A very queer expression and a quite natural one!- But is that
alii Isn’t’ there a deeper explanation;. ..Well, have I myself a deeper understanding? Have
I got more than I give in the explanation?”79 The theories of meaning we considered
assumed that there is something behind all of these uses of words and explanations that
we give of them, something which is the meaning. To use Wittgenstein’s metaphor; in
order to see the essence of meaning we attempted to strip off all of the ordinary
manifestations to get to the ‘real’ meaning. “In order to find the real artichoke, we
divested it of its leaves
” 80 But it turns out that there is nothing behind these manifestations
of meaning, no special mental state, no mysterious process, nothing. All there is to
meaning are all of these activities, uses we make of our predicates!
‘'Wittgenstein [1981], §209.
Wittgenstein [1981], §164.
54
We can even call the above solution ‘sceptical.’ There are no ‘meanings’ in the
sense implied by such theories as SAP or the picture-theory of meaning. There is no more
to meaning than the way in which we make use of it. However, to assert this does not
imply that just any application of the predicate we make is the ‘correct’ one. The correct
use is the use in accordance with the “meaning” of the predicate. This may sound
paradoxical. Have we not just argued that there are no such objects as ‘meaning’ which
account for the normative relationship between predicates their application. To anticipate,
it turns out that normativity does not require such entities. Normative relationships are
forged in grammar, not by some mysterious mental or Platonic states . 81
Even before we answer the question of how predicates and their extensions have
the special kind of normative relationship which we discussed above, we already can claim
a tentative victory over the sceptic. The sceptical paradox had its beginnings in the
sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure whether our present usage of the V accords
with the meaning with which we used this sign previously. What is implied in this
question, is that there is some entity which ‘accompanies’ each of our utterances, and
hence we can wonder whether the present use of a V sign is accompanied by the same
entity which accompanied our previous uses. Now, given that Wittgenstein has shown
that there is no, and could not be any ‘meaning-constitutive’ entity, the question seems to
be misguided. In what sense can we ask whether the same meaning accompanies our
present application of the term. Of course, this sceptical question may be taken to query
*'See G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker, Scepticism. Rules and Language . (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),
p. 99ff.
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simply whether our present usage of the V sign is the correct. And as we shall see
momentarily, Wittgenstein’s view is well equipped to answer this question.
As Kripke himself acknowledges, much of his own criticism of the various theories
ot meaning stems from the fact that these theories cannot account for the normative
relationship that holds between predicates and their extension/applications. The idea here
is somewhat elusive, but may be cashed out in the following way. When we use some
predicate, certain objects are such that they are the ‘right’ ones, that is the word is applied
correctly to them. In addition, when we use a certain predicate, it somehow “shows”
which applications/uses are the correct ones. In the case of the original mathematical
example the ‘meaning’ of the *+’ had to “show that only ‘125’, not ‘5, is the answer I
‘ought’ to give.” 82 And as Kripke acknowledges, all of the theories of meaning he
considers in the development of his ‘sceptical paradox’ fail to adequately explain this
relationship. 83 Further, in a note, Kripke points out that the failure of these theories to
account for this relationship is akin to Russell’s failure to properly account for the
relationship between desire and its objects. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein rejects
Russell’s view “because it makes the relation between a desire and its objects an ‘external’
relation.. .Wittgenstein’s view that the relation between the desire (expectation, etc.) and
its object must be ‘internal’, not ‘external’.”84 Similarly, the theories of meaning such as
picture-theory, dispositional account, etc., imply that the relationship of meaning to its
*2 Kripke, p. 1 1.
10 Kripke, p. 1 1.
S4 Kripke, p. 25, 19n.
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application/use is not normative (internal), but descriptive (external). 85 Ultimately, I
believe this is the correct account ot the failure ol these various theories of meaning, and
ot Wittgenstein s view on meaning. The crucial difference between my reading and
Kripke’s, however, is that predicates themselves have this relation to their extension, not
some mysterious, meaning, mediating between the predicate and its application ! 86
But what is this ‘internal ’ 87 relationship that predicates have with their extension?
The relationship between desire and its satisfaction, or expectation and the object
expected, is a useful example of such relationship. Pace Russell, to say that I desire
(want) an apple, is not to imply that I would need to conduct an experiment and see if my
eating an apple will bring about some third thing which would “quiet my ‘searching’
activity.”88
I believe Russell’s theory amounts to the following: if I give someone an order
and I am happy with what he then does, then he carried out my order. (If I wanted
to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the stomach taking away my appetite,
then it was originally this punch that I wanted
.)
89
* 3 Kripke, p. 25, 19n.
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It is perhaps the failure to recognise this distinction that led Kripke to propose his ‘sceptical
solution’.
k7As will become clear, I rely heavily on the discussion by G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker in my
explanation of the notion of ‘internal relationship’. However, I do not intend to imply that they would
endorse my interpretation of Wittgenstein or Kripke as presented above.
XH Kripke, p. 25n.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), p. 63.
Also quoted in Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 108.
57
The desire for an apple, by definition, is fulfilled by eating an apple, not by anything else.
“It is a necessary truth, or a truth of grammar, the fulfilment of a the desire to drink a pint
oi lager is drinking a pint of lager, not having a swim, let alone being punched in the
stomach...”90 There is nothing for me to ascertain, no experiments that I need to perform
to know what I desire, expect, intend, etc. There is no third thing (such as feeling of
quiescence of desire) against which I need to measure my eating of an apple in order to
ascertain whether it accords with my desire for an apple. There is simply no room for
doubt. Similarly, I do not need to perform an experiment to know what I mean by a
certain word, “...to understand a rule [to know the meaning of a word] is to know what
acts count as correct application and what acts as incorrect ones....The principle that to
understand a rule is to know what would count as acting in accord with it allows of no
general exceptions (though must be so construed that it tolerates the existence of hard
cases under understood rules).”91 To know the meaning of the term ‘red’ is to know
which objects are counted as red object, to know the meaning of the order ‘+2’ is to know
that 1002 is the correct application of this rule, and that 1004 is not. And this does not
imply anything about mysterious entities that contain all of the predicate’s extension. It is
rather a grammatical truth (given our language, practices, etc.) that some uses of a
predicate are the correct ones, and the others are not. “....‘But I already knew, at the time
when I gave the order, that he ought to write 1002 after 1000. ’-Certainly, and you can
'M> Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 108.
1,1 Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 101.
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also say you meant it then; only you should not let yourself be misled by the grammar of
the words 'know’ and ‘mean ’.”92 That is, mislead into thinking that there is some entity
which, at the moment of one’s giving an order, contained all the infinite expansion of the
series.
Ot course, the model of the relationship between desire and its satisfaction
although useful, does not parallel exactly the relationship between predicates and their
applications. In the case of wanting to eat an apple, the description of the object which
would satisfy this particular desire is contained within the very expression of the desire.
This is not the case for most predicates. Consider the following example:
...certain kinds of agitated behaviour in certain circumstances are familiar criteria
for a person’s being angry, but the descriptions of the behaviour and the sentence
‘He is angry’ have nothing in common apart from the reference to the person.
They do not seem to make contact in language—or at least they do so (in the
characterization ‘He reacted angrily’) only in virtue of the internal relation. But if
they do not make contact in language on the perspicuous model of the
characterization of desire and its satisfaction
,
they make contact in the practice of
using language, of explaining and justifying its use . 93
That is, the internal relationship between a predicate and its application is established by
the complex set of various uses we make of the predicate. As was argued, such uses are
all there is to the meaning of a term. So, to say that a person behaves in such and such a
way, says such and such things, etc., is what we mean by the term ‘angry’. So, although
the term ‘angry’ does not contain the descriptions of these activities and uses, it is a
grammatical truth that these applications of the term ‘angry’ constitute its meaning.
Wittgenstein [1981], §187.
1,3 Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 115.
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The flip side ot this internal relationship between predicates and their application is
that applications we make of our predicates are criteria for our understanding the meaning
of a predicate, “...acting in certain ways (what is called ‘acting in conformity with the
rule’) are criteria for understanding a rule, and that acting otherwise is a criterion for
failing to understand it.”94 So, to respond with ‘1002, 1004, 1006....’ is the criterion for
our understanding the order ‘+2’, while responding ‘1004, 1008, 1012....’ is a criterion for
misunderstanding this order. However, saying that certain applications of the predicate
are the criteria for understanding the meaning of the predicate, is not to say that they are
evidence for some special state behind these applications. These applications are part of
what constitutes the meaning of the predicate! To point to cucumber and say ‘green’ is
part of the meaning of the term ‘green’. There is nothing more to the term ‘green’ than
the multitude of applications of it (including teaching the word, applying it, explaining its
use, etc.). So, to say that an application of the term is the criterion for understanding the
term, is not to think of such relationship as the relationship say between a scientific theory
and empirical data. The relationship between the scientific hypothesis and the empirical
data is an external relationship, very different from the internal relationship that obtains
between predicates and their applications.
The observed physical phenomena the scientists seeks to explain and predict are
externally related to the hypothesis the scientists constructs; the correctness of the
identification of the phenomena [empirical data] is not necessarily vitiated by the
falsification of the hypothesis. By contrast, the rule and the conforming behaviour
are internally related. So, too is deviant behaviour; for if behaviour is correctly
'w Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 103.
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identified as violating a rule, it confirms rather than falsifies the hypothesis that
there is such-and-such a rule. A rule is not an explanatory hypothesis.... 95
In other words, unlike in the case of a scientific hypothesis, it is part of the meaning of the
term 'green' that it applies to objects of this! colour. It is part of the meaning of the order
add 2’, that ‘ 1002, 1004...’ is the correct expansion of this series and vice-versa. For
some object to be identified as green is to say that it belongs to the extension of the term
'green'. What these considerations underscore, is that there is simply no room for doubt
or justification in the relationship between predicates and their extension. It is not the case
that we may mean ‘green’ and not know which objects this term should be applied to, it is
inconceivable that we may understand the order ‘+2’ and not know that 1002 is the next
term after 1000 in this series.
However, the sceptic may object here that even if we accept that the relationship
between a predicate and its application is internal, the problem of new applications still
remains. How is an individual supposed to apply predicate to new cases to which neither
he nor his fellow language speakers have applied the predicate before? This objection,
although seemingly legitimate, belies the misunderstanding of the concept of internal
relationship. To know the meaning of the term is not to get hold of in some way of all the
cases in which the term has been applied. This would be similar to the view of meaning as
some mysterious mental state containing all the applications of the predicate. In this case
the container would simply be finite not infinite. However, this does not describe an
internal relationship. The meaning of a term is not a container containing infinite or finite
1,5
Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 92.
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number of applications of the predicate. If anything, understanding the meaning is an
ability to use the term in a certain way. Suppose, as in Kripke’s example, we as a
community of language speakers, have never used the *+’ in the context of ‘68+57’, are
we to answer ‘125’ or ‘5’? But let us think back to how we were taught the meaning of
the '+’. We were given, for example, problems like ‘3+4’, ‘11 + 12’, ‘15+43’ and were
told that the correct answers are ‘7’, ‘23’, and ’58’ respectively. There was no mention of
things like ‘for arguments greater than 57 answer 5’ or ‘x+y= x and y, if x, y< 57 and =5
otherwise
. Furthermore, if asked to explain the rule for the use of *+’, would any one of
us give such explanations as ‘x+y=x and y, if x, y <57 and =5 otherwise’? Clearly not!
The point is that understanding the meaning of a symbol is not some mysterious state
containing all (or any) applications of the predicate, it is an ability to apply the predicate in
ways consistent with the explanations, teaching and use of the predicate within our
language, our form of life! “...The unlimitedness of the range of acts that a person would
count as in accord with a given rule would not supply any grounds for scepticism, but
simply reflect the unlimited applicability of the rule he understands.”96 Of course, there
might be difficult cases in which an individual may be not sure whether a certain term
applies, but this vagueness can hardly be viewed as the reason to deny that predicates have
normative/internal relationships with their applications.
I say ‘There is a chair’. What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly
disappears from sight?—”So it wasn’t a chair but some kind of illusion.’’-But in a
few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.-”So the chair was
there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion.”—But suppose after
% Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 106.
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a time it disappears again-or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have
you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the ‘chair’ to
include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word ‘chair’;
and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because
we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?97
Our language rests upon the background (see next chapter) of certain facts about
out selves and our world which conditions our linguistic and non-linguistic activities. It is
part of this background that we do not encounter objects of the type described above
(“our” chairs do not usually disappear for no reason). So, we simply do not have words
that describe this type of objects. Calling such object a ‘chair’ (or refusing to call it a
‘chair’) would be outside our ordinary language game of applying the term ‘chair’ and
hence would not influence either way this language game.
Related to this, is the objection that even when a person uses a predicate in
accordance with its “meaning”, i.e. responds ‘125’ to ‘68+57’, calls ripe cucumbers
‘green’, etc., we may still be unsure whether the person understands the meaning of the
term. It is, for example, always possible that in a future application the person will use the
term incorrectly (e.g. will call celery ‘blue’, or refuse to apply ‘green’ to anything but
cucumbers). In what sense are such applications criteria for the correct understanding of a
predicate. How are we justified in saying that the predicates are internally related to their
application? There are two confusions evident in this objection. First, it trades on the
same view of meaning that was rejected above. Accordingly, it assumes that only the
person himself can be sure whether he understands the meaning of the term, and that all
1,7
Wittgenstein [1981], §80.
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we have to go on are the behavioural manifestations of it. But this is simply not the case;
as we emphasised to understand the term is to have an ability to employ it correctly.
There is nothing more to the meaning of the term than our ability to employ it in certain
ways. So there is no special state that a person has access to, which would assure whether
he knows the meaning of a term or not.
Must I know whether I understand a word? Don’t I also sometimes imagine
myself to understand a word (as I may imagine I understand a kind of
calculation)and then realize that I did not understand it? (“I thought I knew what
‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ motion meant, but I see that I don’t know.”)98
Of course the criteria for having such abilities are much more complex than they would be
lor the mysterious mental state of understanding. 99 Indeed, if per itnpossibile, the meaning
of a term were to be embodied in some mental state, one incorrect application of the term
would be the criteria for the person not having such a state. There would be no room for
mistake since all of the applications of the predicate would be contained in this mysterious
mental act. But this is clearly not how we ordinarily speak of meaning and understanding.
No single act is sufficient to either establish that one has or does not have an ability, while
it is a grammatical truth that the criterion for having an ability to do x is simply doing x.
This is a tricky point which may give rise to various misinterpretations of the internal
relationship between predicates and their applications. Perhaps an example may help us
understand this difficult point. It is a grammatical truth that the only action which would
‘satisfy’ the statement ‘He is able to lift 100 pounds’ is the lifting of 100 pounds, not
w Wittgenstein [1981], p. 53.
w Wittgenstein [1981], §182.
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doing 15 somersaults or riding a bike. This is what being able to lift 100 pounds is.
However, attributing this ability to a person depends on a variety of circumstances. For
example, a single failure to lift the 100 pound weight is not necessarily the criteria of not-
being able to lift a hundred pounds (perhaps the weight is glued to the floor, or the
peison s hand slips or something of this sort). However, if the person continues to fail in
his attempts to lift a 100 pound weight, at some point we would say that he does not have
the ability to lift 100 pounds. So, while it is a grammatical truth that to say that a person
has an ability to lift a 100 pounds, if under such circumstances he lifts 100 pounds, it does
not make sense to speak of some single action that would establish whether a person does
or does not have this ability. In fact the case is very similar to Wittgenstein’s own
discussion of the puzzles surrounding the term ‘reading’. (See p. 51-52 above) The criteria
for understanding are defeasible, yet the meanings of the terms are internally related to
their application. 100 Perhaps what gives us trouble here is the idea of meaning and
understanding as static phenomena; either we are in a state of understanding or we are
not. Instead, to say that a person understands something is to describe certain
circumstances and certain actions; to say that a person does not understand is to describe
others. And it is perfectly possible that according to a description at t' a person
understands the meaning of the term ‘red’ and at t" the person does not understand the
term ‘red’. ‘But does he actually understand it or not?!’ If this is a question about some
mysterious state of understanding it does not make sense! To use Wittgenstein’s phrase
""’See Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 111-112.
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Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And
when you see them there is a good deal that you will not say).” 101
It seems that there are no prima facia objections to the view that predicates are
internally related to their applications. Indeed, the view seems to capture correctly the
notion of normativity which we were unable to capture with other theories of meaning.
To recapitulate: there are no such entities as meanings (mental states, pictures,
interpretations, etc.) which somehow connect predicates with their applications.
Meanings of terms are exhibited by the complex set of uses we make of the predicates
(including teaching the predicate, explaining rules for its use, etc.). What makes some
applications of the predicate correct and others incorrect are the internal relationships
established in our grammar between predicates and some set of their applications. In
other words, there is nothing more to the meaning of the term ‘red’ than that it applies to
objects of this! colour, this is what ‘red’ means. So, there is no room for ‘sceptical
doubt’ as there is no question of whether a certain application (hard cases aside) ‘accords’
with the meaning of the term. Rather all there is to being a certain term/expression is that
it is applied/used in these and not those ways. Consequently, to understand (know the
meaning of ) the term/expression is not to be in possession of some special state. To
understand a term is simply to be able to use it in the ways which are ‘meaning-
constitutive’ for this term.
11,1 Wittgenstein [1981], §79.
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This exposition seems to answer the central concern raised by Kripke in
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language of how is it possible for predicates to have a
normative relationship with their applications/uses. However, an important issue has not
been touched in this exposition, the question of what stands behind the language games,
and what explains the fact that we have the particular language games that we have. I
shall discuss these issues in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Section I
The above solution, although apparently resolving the central difficulty raised by
the sceptical paradox, i.e. the question of how predicates have a normative relationship to
their extension, may leave one feeling unsatisfied. This feeling maybe cashed out by
asking the following question: How is it that words have the particular internal
relationships that they do, or, what stands behind our particular practices of using words?
And there is nothing in our explanation of internal relationships, that would answer these
questions.
It is perhaps in answering these question that we can bridge the gap between
Kripke’s 'sceptical solution’ and Wittgenstein’s own view, as was presented above. As it
was argued in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein’s view of meaning, and more specifically
of the normative relationships between predicates and their applications, is that such
relationships are internal, they are forged in the grammar of our language. However to
say this is only to describe what may be called the foreground of our language . 102 This
foreground, roughly, is the multitude of language games with associated rules, practices
and institutions. Yet, all of these language games are possible only against the complex
background, or framework. This framework includes, but is not limited to, various
empirical facts about ourselves (our physiology, our history and development, etc.), our
world (facts about physical objects that surround us, institutions that we have developed,
HI2The terms ‘foreground’ and ‘background’ are introduced by David Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and
Language
.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Seep. 186ff.
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etc.), and our language (agreement in judgments, requirement for regularity, etc.). While
to say that 125 is the correct answer to '68+57’ is not to say anything about the fact that
we actually agree m our judgments about mathematical problems (we respond with ‘125’,
not because we expect others to agree with us, but because we understand what it is to
add two numbers), the actual language game of addition is possible because, among other
things, we agree in our judgments.
Now, if we take the aim of Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ to be primarily pointing
out to us facts about the background (or to use Wittgenstein’s term the bedrock
)
of our
language games, this “solution” becomes much more plausible. As was previously
demonstrated, there are two main ingredients to Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’. On one
hand, according to Kripke, it does not make sense to speak about the truth conditions
under which our applications of the predicates are ‘correct’, we can only speak of
assertability conditions, i.e. “under what circumstances are we allowed to make a given
assertion.” 103 On the other, the community agreement is the element which justifies the
application of our predicates. As was argued these two conditions do not very well mesh
when applied to our language games, and I shall not repeat these criticisms here.
However, if we apply Kripke’s considerations to the background of our language games,
these considerations seem to be much less controversial and more in tune with what I
believe to be Wittgenstein’s own view.
103 Kripke, p. 74.
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First, when we speak of the background conditions of our language game, it does
not in tact make sense to speak about these conditions being correct or incorrect. How
are we to justify the fact that there is a certain constancy and uniformity in the world
aiound us? Is it correct that our predicates apply to this kind of objects and not to
randomly vanishing and reappearing objects of the kind described above? We further tend
to agree not only in our definitions’ but also, over all, in the judgments that we make, in
the way we react to various natural stimulus, etc. Is it ‘right’ that we do so? According
to Wittgenstein, these questions do not make sense. Uniformity of the world, agreement,
etc. are the conditions which make our language games possible. They determine what
kind of language games we can have. And there is no way to justify these facts by some
further conditions. It does not even make sense to speak of some totality of conditions
which make our language possible.
Second, agreement is clearly an important background condition for the possibly
of language in the way we conceive of it. The possibility of using language as a means of
communication, of teaching it, of explaining the meanings of the words, depends on the
brute fact that our reactions in similar circumstances are roughly homogeneous. The
reliance on such agreement is embedded in the very essence of our language, and without
it language as we know it would not be possible. So, while it does not make sense to say
that a particular response is correct because everyone would agree with it, it does make
sense to say that the existence of stable language games is conditioned by the empirical
fact that we actually agree in our judgments (but also, for example, by the fact that pieces
of cheese do not suddenly change in weight). However, it is also a brute fact about our
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language that these background conditions are not part of the actual language games.
This is a critical issue, which seems to be misrepresented in Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’.
Only a few days before his death Wittgenstein wrote the following:
Certain events would put me in a position in which I could not go on with the old-
language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the sureness of the
game. Indeed, doesn t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is
conditioned by certain facts?
In that case it would seem as if the language game must “show” the facts that
make it possible. (But that’s not how it is
.)
104
(sic)
The above considerations illustrate the distinction between what we called the
foreground and the background conditions of our language games. While the foreground
consists of the particular language games that we engage in, the background conditions
put broad constraints on the kind of language games that we can possibly engage in. And,
if we take Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ to be primarily concerned with the background
conditions of our language games both his claim that it does not make sense to justify the
[background] conditions of our language-games by reference to anything, and his
emphasis on ‘community agreement’ become much more plausible. Of course, I do not
intend to represent Kripke as actually attempting to bring our attention to these
background conditions in his ‘sceptical solution’. Nowhere in Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Language does he mention such background conditions, or makes the distinction
between the foreground and background. Ail I mean to suggest is that we can construe
Kripke’s discussion in a way that it points out important facts about the background
Im Ludwig Wittgenstein. On Certainty
.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), paragraphs 617-618, 23 April 1951.
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conditions of our language, and that so construed, plays an important role in explaining
Wittgenstein’s view of meaning.
So. given the above distinction we can an attempt to specify at least some of the
most important background conditions and constraints under which an internal
relationship is established. And as we shah see ‘community agreement’, among many
other conditions, is what makes meaningful language possible. Thus understood, the
•sceptical solution’ becomes significantly less controversial. After all, it would be
ridiculous to claim that our words could not have “meant” different things, i.e. that the V
sign could not have been used to “denote” quaddition, not addition, or that the word
(sound) ‘table’ could not have been used to “refer” to chairs, or aeroplanes, or simply be a
“meaningless” noise. So, it is legitimate to ask how internal relationships get established,
and how the words come to have the meanings that they do.
Fortunately, Wittgenstein has an answer to this question. And his answer may
even be called ‘communitarian’, if by ‘communitarian’ we mean, not that it is senseless to
speak of one individual meaning anything by his words, but that it does not make sense to
speak of words as having meanings outside of the extremely complex framework of
human activities, outside of a certain ‘form of life’! That is, words/symbols/sounds do not
get their meaning from some mysterious states of mind, or in virtue of relationship to
some Platonic facts. Instead, what makes certain words/symbols into ‘meaningful’ signs
(in contrast to other symbols/sounds that are not meaningful) is a slew of facts about our
world, our language, and our form of life! And while of course we cannot enumerate all
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the necessary and sufficient conditions that make our language possible, it does make
sense to emphasise some aspects which are at the essence of our linguistic practices.
First, sounds/symbols/expressions are as much part of the world as tables, chairs,
and cucumbers. Linguistic ability is not some special kind of ability, radically different
trom other abilities. Just as we learn to ride a bicycle, we learn to use various symbols and
sounds as part of our language. Language is an integral part of the world, part of the way
we live. “Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much part of our natural
history as walking, eating, drinking, playing .” 105 Language is not even restricted to what
we may call linguistic objects. “What about the colour samples that A shews to B: are
they part of language? Well, it is as you please. They do not belong among the words;
yet when I say to someone: ‘Pronounce the word ‘the’ ‘, you will count the second ‘the’
as part of the sentence. Yet it has a role just like that of a colour-sample in language
game. ...It is most natural, and causes least confusion, to reckon the samples among the
instruments of language .” 106 Language, is a part of our world, our way of life, and hence
we cannot speak of language as something separate from the variety of our everyday
activities. Language in general, and meaningful use of particular predicates, cannot be
divorced from this framework. ‘The metaphysical gulf between language and reality is a
philosophical illusion.” 107
105 Wittgenstein [1981], §25.
I0<1 Wittgenstein [1981], §16.
11,7 Baker and Hacker [1984], p. 134.
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Second, given this essential connection with our form of life, there are certain
restrictions as to what counts as meaningful symbols/sounds/predicates. For example, we
cannot imagine a meaningful symbol outside of our practice of using it.
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone
obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on
which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.-To obey a
rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs
(uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language.
To understand a language means to be master of a technique
.
108
Such practices must also be regular. After all, making the same sound on various
occasions without any discernible regularity, or without any regular connections with
actions, would not make such sound into a meaningful predicate. Wittgenstein imagines a
community of speakers engaged in such irregular linguistic behaviour. He concludes that
we would not be able to call such linguistic practice a language . 109 Furthermore, to say
that it is only possible to speak of meaningful uses of words within the context of their
use, is not to say that it is simply sufficient for a meaningful discourse to have
words/sounds being correlated in some regular way with certain actions. Much more is
required, in our language, to provide for the meaningfulness of certain sounds. The idea
here, although seemingly trivial, is of paramount importance for the entirety of
Wittgenstein’s view of language. “It is only in language that I can mean something by
something .” 110 And language is a bewilderingly complex system of institutions, including
lllK Wittgenstein [1981], §199.
I,w Wittgenstein [1981], §207.
Wittgenstein [1981], p. 18n.
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such things as teaching of language, explanations of meaning, defining of linguistic
categories, agreeing in our uses, etc. “As things are I can, for example, invent a game that
is never played by anyone.-But would the following be possible too: mankind has never
played any games; once, however, someone invented a game-which no one ever
played. For the term ‘game’ to have meaning, it is necessary to have, as it were, the
whole ‘language-game’ for using the word ‘game’. And in order for this language game
to exist, we must have other language games. In short, we need the whole language to
endow any particular part of it with meaning.
Third, our language relies on a certain constancy of our surroundings. ‘The
procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the
scale would loose its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or
shrink for no obvious reason.” 112 It is a brute empirical fact that objects that surround us
do not randomly shrink or disappear or change colour. So, we simply do not have words
that describe such ever-changing objects. It is simply a brute fact about our predicates
that they are applied in a roughly uniform manner. So, to return to Wittgenstein’s
example, we would be hard-pressed to call some ever-changing ‘chair-like’ object a
‘chair’. We, further, would not admit that a person understands, say, the term ‘red’ if he
applies it alternatively to red, green, magenta, and blue objects, (although of course it is
possible that in another language, another form of life, the term ‘red’ may be used in
111
Wittgenstein [19811, §204.
112 Wittgenstein [1981], §142.
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precisely this way) “...what we call ‘measuring’ is partly determined by a certain
constancy in results of measurement” 113
Finally, agreement is clearly is an essential part of the framework that makes our
language possible. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the
question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don’t come to blows over it, for
example. That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is
based...’
114 (my italics) Our ability to have the language games that we have, use language
as means of communications, teach children our language, etc. would not be possible
unless there is an overall agreement in the broadest sense of the word. That is, we must
agree in the definitions of the terms we use. We must also agree, ‘queer as it may sound’
in the applications of our predicates, i.e. agreeing in our judgments. This idea sounds
paradoxical and seems ‘to abolish logic’ as Wittgenstein himself points out
,
115
since
clearly our community agreement does not determine whether the judgment is correct or
incorrect. Yet, once relegated to the background of our language games, this idea ceases
to be paradoxical. The point is that if we did not, by and large, agree, say, in our
attributions of colour, such attributions would stop having any useful role in our language.
So, agreement in definitions and in judgments are essential to the possibility of our
language games, however, not in the way envisioned by Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’.
113 Wittgenstein [1981], §242.
114 Wittgenstein [1981], §240.
115 Wittgenstein [1981], §242.
76
These four aspects of the background upon which our language is based, although
clearly not providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of our language
games, seem to be especially important for the proper understanding of the true nature of
our language games. That is why Wittgenstein incorporates the discussion of these issues
into his investigation of the notion of meaning in the pre §243 sections of the
Philosophical Investigations.
Given these background restrictions on our language games, it may be more clear
why it does not make sense to speak of a predicate ‘considered by itself as having
meaning! The ‘internal’ relations described above cannot be established and maintained
without the extremely complex set of linguistic and non-linguistic activities and institutions
surrounding uses of particular predicates. And it is this complex framework which
provides the basis, the ‘bedrock’ upon which the ‘internal’ relationships between
predicates and their applications stand. These activities and institutions are typically
social, and it would take an inordinate amount of imagination to conceive of such
complexity in the case of one individual. So, in this sense, it does not make sense to speak
of single individual developing and maintaining such a complex framework.
Section II
Finally, a few words must be said about the issue of private language. The issue of
private language is by itself extremely complex and its investigation goes beyond the scope
of this paper. However, we must see whether Kripke’s claim that the solution to the
‘private language’ argument is found in the discussion of rule-following, would hold given
the alternative interpretation discussed above. And indeed, this is an area where both
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Kiipke s view and the view I discussed above are the closest in their assessment and then-
conclusion. I think, as Kripke does, that the considerations on meaning in the pre §243
part of Philosophical Investigations have, as their implication, the subsequent rejection of
•private language’. As Kripke asserts, further claims of the ultimate failure of private
language depend upon the ‘private model’ of how words have meaning. However, unlike
Kripke’ s rejection of private language, the rejection implied in the above interpretation
does not depend upon any verificationist premise. Let me attempt an explanation.
As Wittgenstein himself explains, a private language would be a language “which
describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand...” 116 (my italics)
An example of such a language would be one in which a person who invents some term
‘P’ to identify some sensation S. Could we say that such sign ‘P’ has meaning in virtue of
its relationship to sensation S? Well, given our interpretation of Wittgenstein, clearly not.
Association of words and particular objects, whether private or not, does not provide
signs with meaning as was argued above. In fact, this picture is rejected by Wittgenstein
as early as his discussion of the simple Augustinian theory of meaning. Nor, as it was
shown, can we appeal to any mental or Platonic fact to account for the normative
relationship which is required for meaning in the case of private sensations. Of course, we
do engage in sensations language all the time. We say that we have pain, we complain
that we are in bad mood, we say that we feel a tingling sensation in right foot, etc.
However, the meanings of these terms are not established by reference to some essentially
lf
' Wittgenstein [19811, §256.
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private object. It is established in the same way that meanings of other words are
established: by using them in particular language games, by teaching these words, by
explaining the rules of using such terms, etc.
....Well, let’s assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for sensation!-
But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he used the word.
So, does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to
anyone?—But what does it mean to say that he has named his pain?-How has he
done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?-When
one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one forgets that a great deal of stage-
setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense.
And when we speak ol someone s having given a name to pain, what is
presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the ‘pain’; it shews the post where
the new word is stationed
.
117
Hence, given this view of meaning, private language is a contradiction in terms.
This of course is only a sketch; as I mentioned, an adequate treatment of the topic
of private language is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this sketch is sufficient
for the purposes of comparison to Kripke’s own discussion of private language.
Unfortunately, Kripke’s discussion of private language is extremely terse to say the least.
He never even discusses the issue of private language as presented by Wittgenstein. All he
claims is that his interpretation of rule-following would exclude the possibility of private
language. However, it is not clear how exactly his interpretation would accomplish this.
Either we can take him to mean something similar to our conclusions as outlined above,
which I believe is the correct reflection of Wittgenstein’s thinking on the matter. Or, we
can take him to mean that private language is impossible because there, by definition,
would not be any room to check an individual’s responses against those of the community.
1 Wittgenstein [1981], §257.
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Indeed, this is the interpretation of Kripke’s views on private language that is proposed by
Bruce Aune. “The sceptical solution he [Kripke] read Wittgenstein as providing is that
social practice (rather than anything true of an individual speaker) will determine what is
correct in future cases. This solution is not applicable to private language, and that is a
fundamental objection to such a thing .” 118
Now, if this is the reasoning behind Kripke’s rejection of the private language, then
it is of course fundamentally different from the interpretation that I favour. As Aune
points out, in light of the doubt that ‘community agreement’ can provide the required
normativity, it would make the rejection of the private language argument more dubious.
It there are reasons to believe that an appeal to ‘community agreement’ cannot establish
meanings of either public or private terms, then the fact that it is impossible to ‘verily’
meanings of private terms by the appeal to community agreement cannot provide grounds
for the rejection of private language.
The problem with private language, as it was outlined earlier, is not that we would
not have any reliable way to verify these statements, rather, given our form of life, such
naming of private sensations would not count as language at all. Internal relationships
between predicates and their applications are not established by ostensive definitions,
public or private. And hence, such gesturing towards private sensations would not
establish the internal relationship between the sign and its application.
IIX Bruce Aune, Knowledge of the External World . (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 123.
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Of course there is much more that can be said about the issue of private language,
and the various confusions surrounding our talk of mental phenomena. This is a project
tor another occasion. All I hoped to accomplish by the above sketch is to give support to
Ki ipke s contention that the discussion of meaning by Wittgenstein in the earlier part of
Philosophical Investigations
,
implies, in some sense, the subsequent rejection of private
language.
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CONCLUSION
Several important points seem to emerge from the above discussion. First,
Kripke's discussion of ‘Wittgenstein’s ‘sceptical paradox’ provides us with an overall
correct interpretation of Wittgenstein’s arguments in the sections preceding the discussion
of private language in Philosophical Investigations. That is, just as Kripke claimed,
Wittgenstein discusses and rejects various candidates for the meaning-constitutive facts
and ultimately claims that no intermediate entity can be thought of as embodying the
meaning of a predicate. Second, the acceptance of this interpretation of Wittgenstein does
not commit us, Kripke s claims notwithstanding, to the acceptance of the ‘sceptical
solution as proposed by Kripke. Instead, a much more plausible solution can be found in
Wittgenstein which provides for the normative relationship between predicates and their
applications. It turns out that such normative relationship is assured not by an appeal to
some third entity mediating between a predicate and its applications, but in virtue of the
special internal relationship established between a predicate and certain applications in the
course of our practice of using these predicates. Hence, there is no room for sceptical
doubt about whether certain applications (difficult cases aside) “accord” with the meaning
of the term. To put it somewhat crudely there is no more to the meaning of the term than
the complex set of uses we make of the predicates (including teaching the predicate,
explaining rules for its use, etc.). Third, although Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ is not
effective in explaining the normative relationship between predicates and their
applications, it has an important role to play in pointing out to us the crucial facts about
what was termed as the background conditions of our language games. So, instead of
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being an interesting, but misguided interpretation, Kripke’s discussion in Wittgenstein on
Rules and Private Language seems to provide us with a way of making sense of
Wittgenstein’s complex discussion presented in the pre §243 sections of Philosophical
Investigations.
Moreover, it seems to me that Kripke’s discussion in Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Language
,
is the prime example of the kind of philosophy Wittgenstein has
envisioned. In the introduction to Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes: “I
should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible,
to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. 119 And while there are, as I argued, many
features about Kripke’s interpretation that do not reflect correctly Wittgenstein’s thinking,
the discussion overall succeeds remarkably in clarifying and even supplementing
Wittgenstein’s thinking about the nature of our language. Clearly, our philosophical
thinking would hardly profit from perpetual rehashing of the old arguments, instead we
must establish a dialogue, as it were, between the great thinkers of the past and our
modern attempts to make sense of our world. Only through such dialogue we would be
able to move forward in our philosophical inquiry.
Of course much more work needs to be done both, to make sense of
Wittgenstein’s thinking in Philosophical Investigations and, more generally, to understand
the true nature of our linguistic practices. In particular, the issue of private language has
been neither adequately resolved in Kripke’s discussion nor in the brief sketch presented
" y Wittgenstein [1981], p. viii.
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above. Also, the proper place of Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning in the larger
context of Philosophical Investigations must be ascertained in order to understand the hill
implications of his view. However, even before these issues are resolved Wittgenstein’s
contribution to the modern philosophical discourse is undeniable. Even more importantly
than any substantive conclusions about the nature of our language Wittgenstein has shown
us that the clarity about these issues is not gained by inventing complex and often
contused theories, but by careful examination of our actual language which lies at the very
foundation of our form of life. This seemingly minor point has had far-reaching influence
on the whole of philosophical discourse in the analytical tradition and it is not surprising
that Wittgenstein’s work remains at the centre of philosophical discussion many years after
his death. In fact I am confident that the legacy of this ‘most important’ philosopher of
the twentieth century will exert influence over the philosophical discussion far into the
next millennium.
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